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stackpilot/backend/routers/auth.py
T
menzeljandClaude Opus 5 e650aa6833
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Add API tokens for scripts and CI (0.57.0)
A session token is the wrong credential for automation. It expires in an hour,
it is minted by typing a password, and revoking it signs every one of that
person's devices out. So automation gets its own credential, revocable on its
own, and showing up in the audit log as itself.

Three decisions worth recording, because each one is a place this could have
been built wrong.

**Only a hash is stored.** This is the opposite call from registry passwords one
release ago, and for a concrete reason: a registry password has to be handed
back to the registry, so it must be recoverable and is encrypted. A token is
only ever compared against, so it does not need to be — and not keeping it is
the difference between leaking the database and leaking everything the database
protects. It is shown once and cannot be recovered; a readable prefix is kept so
rows are still identifiable in the UI and the audit log. The hash is SHA-256,
deliberately not bcrypt: bcrypt is slow to make guessing low-entropy human
passwords expensive, and a token is 256 bits of secrets output, so the cost
would buy nothing and would land on every single API request.

**The scope is not folded into the User object.** get_current_user returns a
session-attached row; downgrading its role in place to represent a read-only
token would be written back to the database the next time anything committed
that user — logout-everywhere does exactly that. So the token row is stashed on
request.state and require_admin consults it, leaving the User untouched. The
same lookup caps a token at its owner's authority rather than trusting the scope
alone, so a demoted admin's token drops to read-only with them and a disabled
account's tokens stop working.

**A token cannot make itself permanent.** Creating tokens and creating users now
require a signed-in session, via a require_session dependency that rejects
token-authenticated requests. Without it, a leaked CI credential could mint a
second one and survive its own revocation — the failure mode where revoking the
leak does nothing. This is the one behaviour change for existing installs:
scripted user creation now needs a login.

The WebSocket routes still take JWTs only. They carry logs, the terminal and the
deploy console, which a CI job has no use for, and leaving them alone keeps the
token surface to the REST API.

19 tests, covering what is stored, that a read token really is read-only while
its owner is an admin, that demoting and disabling the owner both take effect,
expiry, tampering, the throttle on last-used writes, and that a token can
neither mint another nor create a user. Verified end to end against a running
app: two tokens, both scopes, revocation, and no plaintext anywhere in the
database or the list response.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 00:53:58 +02:00

340 lines
12 KiB
Python

"""Authentication routes + first-launch setup wizard."""
from __future__ import annotations
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
from sqlmodel import Session, delete, select
import auth as auth_mod
from database import get_session
from models.runtime_state import LoginAttempt
from models.user import (
LoginRequest,
RefreshRequest,
TokenPair,
User,
UserCreate,
UserRead,
UserUpdate,
)
from config import settings
from services import audit_service
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
# Login rate limit: max 10 attempts per minute per client IP.
#
# Kept in the database rather than a module dict. In memory it reset on every
# restart — so an attacker could clear their own budget by getting the process
# to restart — and with more than one uvicorn worker each worker enforced its
# own limit, multiplying the real allowance by the worker count.
#
# The IP is only meaningful because uvicorn runs with --proxy-headers; without
# that every request looks like it comes from the frontend container and this
# would throttle all users together.
_RATE_LIMIT = 10
_RATE_WINDOW = timedelta(seconds=60)
#: Attempts older than this are deleted while we are in the table anyway.
_RATE_RETENTION = timedelta(hours=1)
def _check_rate_limit(session: Session, ip: str) -> None:
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
session.exec(delete(LoginAttempt).where(LoginAttempt.at < now - _RATE_RETENTION))
recent = session.exec(
select(LoginAttempt).where(
LoginAttempt.ip == ip, LoginAttempt.at >= now - _RATE_WINDOW
)
).all()
if len(recent) >= _RATE_LIMIT:
session.commit()
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
detail="Too many login attempts, slow down.",
)
session.add(LoginAttempt(ip=ip, at=now))
session.commit()
#: The refresh cookie is scoped to the two endpoints that consume it, so it is
#: not attached to every API call the way a "/" cookie would be.
REFRESH_COOKIE = "stackpilot_refresh"
REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH = "/api/auth"
def _issue(
user: User, response: Response, request: Request, in_body: bool = False
) -> TokenPair:
"""Mint a token pair, putting the refresh token in an httpOnly cookie.
Keeping the long-lived token out of JavaScript's reach means a successful
XSS can no longer walk off with 30 days of access — it is limited to
whatever it can do in the live page. The short-lived access token still
goes to the client, which holds it in memory only.
``in_body`` returns it in the response as well, for scripted clients that
have no cookie jar.
"""
refresh = auth_mod.create_refresh_token(user)
response.set_cookie(
REFRESH_COOKIE,
refresh,
max_age=settings.REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS * 24 * 3600,
httponly=True,
# Lax rather than Strict so following a link into StackPilot keeps you
# signed in; the cookie is only ever read by same-site POSTs anyway.
samesite="lax",
# Only when the request actually arrived over TLS — marking it Secure on
# a plain-HTTP homelab deployment would make the browser drop it and
# nobody could stay signed in. request.url.scheme is trustworthy here
# because uvicorn runs with --proxy-headers.
secure=request.url.scheme == "https",
path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH,
)
return TokenPair(
access_token=auth_mod.create_access_token(user),
refresh_token=refresh if in_body else None,
)
@router.get("/needs-setup")
def needs_setup(session: Session = Depends(get_session)) -> dict:
"""First-launch wizard check: True if no users exist yet."""
return {"needs_setup": not auth_mod.users_exist(session)}
@router.post("/setup", response_model=TokenPair)
def setup(
body: UserCreate,
request: Request,
response: Response,
in_body: bool = False,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> TokenPair:
if auth_mod.users_exist(session):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Setup already completed")
user = User(
username=body.username,
hashed_password=auth_mod.hash_password(body.password),
role="admin",
)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
session.refresh(user)
audit_service.record(
session, user=user.username, action="user.setup", target=user.username
)
return _issue(user, response, request, in_body)
@router.post("/login", response_model=TokenPair)
def login(
body: LoginRequest,
request: Request,
response: Response,
in_body: bool = False,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> TokenPair:
ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
_check_rate_limit(session, ip)
user = auth_mod.authenticate(session, body.username, body.password)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Incorrect username or password",
)
audit_service.record(
session, user=user.username, action="auth.login", target=user.username, ip=ip
)
return _issue(user, response, request, in_body)
@router.post("/refresh", response_model=TokenPair)
def refresh(
request: Request,
response: Response,
body: RefreshRequest | None = None,
in_body: bool = False,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> TokenPair:
"""Exchange a refresh token for a fresh pair.
Reads the httpOnly cookie; a body is accepted as a fallback for clients
that cannot hold one. The token is re-validated against the live user, so a
password reset or a disabled account takes effect here too rather than at
the end of the token's 30-day life.
"""
token = request.cookies.get(REFRESH_COOKIE) or (body.refresh_token if body else None)
if not token:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="No refresh token"
)
payload = auth_mod.decode_token(token, "refresh")
user = auth_mod.resolve_token_user(session, payload)
if not user:
response.delete_cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE, path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Session is no longer valid — sign in again",
)
return _issue(user, response, request, in_body)
@router.post("/logout")
def logout(request: Request, response: Response) -> dict:
"""End the session on this device by dropping the refresh cookie.
Deliberately does not bump ``token_version``: signing out on your phone
should not kill the session on your desktop. Use "sign out everywhere"
for that. The access token is held in memory by the client and dies with
the tab; it stays technically valid for the rest of its hour, which is why
it is short-lived.
"""
response.delete_cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE, path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/logout-everywhere")
def logout_everywhere(
request: Request,
response: Response,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
user: User = Depends(auth_mod.get_current_user),
) -> dict:
"""Revoke every token this account holds, on every device."""
auth_mod.bump_token_version(user)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
response.delete_cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE, path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH)
audit_service.record(
session, user=user.username, action="auth.logout_everywhere",
target=user.username, ip=_ip(request),
)
return {"ok": True}
@router.get("/me", response_model=UserRead)
def me(user: User = Depends(auth_mod.get_current_user)) -> User:
return user
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# User management (admin only)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def _ip(request: Request) -> str:
return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
@router.get("/users", response_model=list[UserRead])
def list_users(
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
_admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin_session),
) -> list[User]:
return session.exec(select(User).order_by(User.id)).all()
@router.post("/users", response_model=UserRead, status_code=201)
def create_user(
body: UserCreate,
request: Request,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin_session),
) -> User:
if not body.username.strip() or not body.password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Username and password required")
if auth_mod.get_user(session, body.username):
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="Username already exists")
role = body.role if body.role in ("admin", "user") else "user"
user = User(
username=body.username,
hashed_password=auth_mod.hash_password(body.password),
role=role,
)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
session.refresh(user)
audit_service.record(
session, user=admin.username, action="user.create", target=user.username,
detail=f"role={role}", ip=_ip(request),
)
return user
@router.patch("/users/{user_id}", response_model=UserRead)
def update_user(
user_id: int,
body: UserUpdate,
request: Request,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin_session),
) -> User:
user = session.get(User, user_id)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
# Guard against locking yourself out / demoting the last admin.
demoting = (body.role is not None and body.role != "admin") or body.is_active is False
if user.role == "admin" and demoting:
other_admins = session.exec(
select(User).where(User.role == "admin", User.is_active == True, User.id != user_id) # noqa: E712
).first()
if not other_admins:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot demote or disable the last active admin")
# Any of these three changes what this account is allowed to do, so the
# tokens it already holds must stop working. Without the bump a password
# reset was cosmetic: whoever had the old tokens kept full access for up to
# 30 days, and a demotion or a disable only took effect once they expired.
authority_changed = (
bool(body.password)
or (body.role is not None and body.role != user.role)
or (body.is_active is not None and body.is_active != user.is_active)
)
if body.password:
user.hashed_password = auth_mod.hash_password(body.password)
if body.role is not None:
if body.role not in ("admin", "user"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid role")
user.role = body.role
if body.is_active is not None:
user.is_active = body.is_active
if authority_changed:
auth_mod.bump_token_version(user)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
session.refresh(user)
audit_service.record(
session, user=admin.username, action="user.update", target=user.username,
ip=_ip(request),
)
return user
@router.delete("/users/{user_id}")
def delete_user(
user_id: int,
request: Request,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin_session),
) -> dict:
user = session.get(User, user_id)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
if user.id == admin.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You cannot delete your own account")
if user.role == "admin":
other_admins = session.exec(
select(User).where(User.role == "admin", User.is_active == True, User.id != user_id) # noqa: E712
).first()
if not other_admins:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot delete the last active admin")
username = user.username
session.delete(user)
session.commit()
audit_service.record(
session, user=admin.username, action="user.delete", target=username,
ip=_ip(request),
)
return {"ok": True}