Files
stackpilot/backend/routers/auth.py
T
menzeljandClaude Opus 5.5 d6cebb3371
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Fix what a review of the whole app found, end to end (0.67.1)
A pass over every feature against a real Docker daemon, then clicking
through the UI as admin and read-only user, on a desktop and a phone.

Security. /ws/deploy ran compose up for the read-only role; it is
admin-only now. A container's inspect view, a stack's compose file
(POSTGRES_PASSWORD: hunter2) and the viewer's .env tab no longer show
credentials to that role. Git branch and URL values that git would read
as options (-x, ext::) are refused. SFTP host keys are checked: pinned
on first use or entered by hand (key line or SHA256 fingerprint), a
different key is refused before the password is sent. A backup name
from the API can no longer reach outside the destination folder. The
file browser refuses to move or rename a browse root, as delete did.

Docker lifecycle. Closing the deploy console released the stack lock
while compose was still running and logged rc=None as success; deploys
and updates are now background runs that hold the lock to the end,
report the real exit code and can be re-attached to. Every closed log
view left a `compose logs -f` behind. A dozen open tabs exhausted the
default thread pool and hung the API; event and exec streams have their
own threads. Auto-update and the update endpoint ignored failed pulls.
A deleted git stack was recreated and started by the next webhook or
poll; deleting a stack now drops its git source, auto-update policy and
schedule entries. Deleting no longer walks into mounted shares, is
refused while a backup runs, and removes the containers even when the
compose file is broken. Stack folders compose has to normalise
(Nextcloud -> nextcloud) work everywhere and group correctly on the
volumes, networks and images pages.

Detection. Host port conflicts read the container's own network
namespace; /proc/1/net is read instead. Images referenced as docker.io/…
were never update-checked; local builds no longer report "needs
credentials". NVIDIA GPUs are read from the driver's procfs. The backup
dialog's "path mismatch" warning came from mountinfo's filesystem-relative
root and fired for any stacks folder on its own disk, ZFS dataset or
btrfs subvolume; the host path now comes from Docker's mounts.

Backups and destinations. The download ignored the folder/volume
selection (axios sent binds[]). Restoring under a new name kept the old
one. A report header past nginx's buffer turned a good backup into a
502. SFTP/S3 errors were bare 500s and "Test" did not try to write.
A destination used by a schedule could be deleted. Backup file names
are in the schedule's or the browser's time zone instead of UTC.

Editor and converter. `docker run` conversion produced invalid compose
for --network host, named volumes and -dit; --gpus and --mount were
dropped; a multi-line command pasted into the one-line field became
`image: ' '` (now a textarea, and flattened continuations are read).
Validation failed for env_file stacks. The editor overwrote unsaved
edits on every container event, lost them on a stray click (now asks),
threw when closing the diff, and its helper panel listed the starter
service "app" for every existing stack. Monaco is bundled instead of
loaded from jsdelivr, so the editor works offline (and monaco-editor
0.57 drops the dompurify advisory; axios and react-router updated).

UI. All times were two hours off: offset-less UTC from SQLite was read
as local time, and "next run" always said "just now". A token refresh
mid-session duplicated deploys, reset terminals and doubled logs. A
backend restart (update, self-update) signed everyone out on reload; the
page now waits for it. The editor was unusable on a phone, tables and
tabs overflowed, dialog text was black on the dark theme, and the file
browser opened on an error with the default roots. Read-only users get
"Admin only" pages instead of 403s; in-use networks offer no delete;
"Scan all" covers StackPilot's own stacks only and runs in the
background instead of timing out at 600s.

Deployment. nginx passes the port in Host (the OIDC redirect URI lost
:5009) and keeps an outer proxy's X-Forwarded-Proto. The frontend waits
for a healthy backend (healthcheck probes every 2s while starting). The
frontend image builds with npm ci. Secrets are 0644 in a 0700 folder so
non-root containers can read them; existing files are fixed at startup.
The test suite no longer starts real containers on a host with Docker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fx7gcuy8d6nPd95g43rGHu
2026-10-15 13:51:26 +02:00

342 lines
12 KiB
Python

"""Authentication routes + first-launch setup wizard."""
from __future__ import annotations
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
from sqlmodel import Session, delete, select
import auth as auth_mod
from database import get_session
from models.runtime_state import LoginAttempt
from models.user import (
LoginRequest,
RefreshRequest,
TokenPair,
User,
UserCreate,
UserRead,
UserUpdate,
)
from config import settings
from services import audit_service
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
# Login rate limit: max 10 attempts per minute per client IP.
#
# Kept in the database rather than a module dict. In memory it reset on every
# restart — so an attacker could clear their own budget by getting the process
# to restart — and with more than one uvicorn worker each worker enforced its
# own limit, multiplying the real allowance by the worker count.
#
# The IP is only meaningful because uvicorn runs with --proxy-headers; without
# that every request looks like it comes from the frontend container and this
# would throttle all users together.
_RATE_LIMIT = 10
_RATE_WINDOW = timedelta(seconds=60)
#: Attempts older than this are deleted while we are in the table anyway.
_RATE_RETENTION = timedelta(hours=1)
def _check_rate_limit(session: Session, ip: str) -> None:
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
session.exec(delete(LoginAttempt).where(LoginAttempt.at < now - _RATE_RETENTION))
recent = session.exec(
select(LoginAttempt).where(
LoginAttempt.ip == ip, LoginAttempt.at >= now - _RATE_WINDOW
)
).all()
if len(recent) >= _RATE_LIMIT:
session.commit()
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
detail="Too many login attempts, slow down.",
)
session.add(LoginAttempt(ip=ip, at=now))
session.commit()
#: The refresh cookie is scoped to the two endpoints that consume it, so it is
#: not attached to every API call the way a "/" cookie would be.
REFRESH_COOKIE = "stackpilot_refresh"
REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH = "/api/auth"
def _issue(
user: User, response: Response, request: Request, in_body: bool = False
) -> TokenPair:
"""Mint a token pair, putting the refresh token in an httpOnly cookie.
Keeping the long-lived token out of JavaScript's reach means a successful
XSS can no longer walk off with 30 days of access — it is limited to
whatever it can do in the live page. The short-lived access token still
goes to the client, which holds it in memory only.
``in_body`` returns it in the response as well, for scripted clients that
have no cookie jar.
"""
refresh = auth_mod.create_refresh_token(user)
response.set_cookie(
REFRESH_COOKIE,
refresh,
max_age=settings.REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS * 24 * 3600,
httponly=True,
# Lax rather than Strict so following a link into StackPilot keeps you
# signed in; the cookie is only ever read by same-site POSTs anyway.
samesite="lax",
# Only when the request actually arrived over TLS — marking it Secure on
# a plain-HTTP homelab deployment would make the browser drop it and
# nobody could stay signed in. request.url.scheme is trustworthy here
# because uvicorn runs with --proxy-headers.
secure=request.url.scheme == "https",
path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH,
)
return TokenPair(
access_token=auth_mod.create_access_token(user),
refresh_token=refresh if in_body else None,
)
@router.get("/needs-setup")
def needs_setup(session: Session = Depends(get_session)) -> dict:
"""First-launch wizard check: True if no users exist yet."""
return {"needs_setup": not auth_mod.users_exist(session)}
@router.post("/setup", response_model=TokenPair)
def setup(
body: UserCreate,
request: Request,
response: Response,
in_body: bool = False,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> TokenPair:
if auth_mod.users_exist(session):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Setup already completed")
if not body.username.strip() or not body.password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Username and password required")
user = User(
username=body.username.strip(),
hashed_password=auth_mod.hash_password(body.password),
role="admin",
)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
session.refresh(user)
audit_service.record(
session, user=user.username, action="user.setup", target=user.username
)
return _issue(user, response, request, in_body)
@router.post("/login", response_model=TokenPair)
def login(
body: LoginRequest,
request: Request,
response: Response,
in_body: bool = False,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> TokenPair:
ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
_check_rate_limit(session, ip)
user = auth_mod.authenticate(session, body.username, body.password)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Incorrect username or password",
)
audit_service.record(
session, user=user.username, action="auth.login", target=user.username, ip=ip
)
return _issue(user, response, request, in_body)
@router.post("/refresh", response_model=TokenPair)
def refresh(
request: Request,
response: Response,
body: RefreshRequest | None = None,
in_body: bool = False,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> TokenPair:
"""Exchange a refresh token for a fresh pair.
Reads the httpOnly cookie; a body is accepted as a fallback for clients
that cannot hold one. The token is re-validated against the live user, so a
password reset or a disabled account takes effect here too rather than at
the end of the token's 30-day life.
"""
token = request.cookies.get(REFRESH_COOKIE) or (body.refresh_token if body else None)
if not token:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="No refresh token"
)
payload = auth_mod.decode_token(token, "refresh")
user = auth_mod.resolve_token_user(session, payload)
if not user:
response.delete_cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE, path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Session is no longer valid — sign in again",
)
return _issue(user, response, request, in_body)
@router.post("/logout")
def logout(request: Request, response: Response) -> dict:
"""End the session on this device by dropping the refresh cookie.
Deliberately does not bump ``token_version``: signing out on your phone
should not kill the session on your desktop. Use "sign out everywhere"
for that. The access token is held in memory by the client and dies with
the tab; it stays technically valid for the rest of its hour, which is why
it is short-lived.
"""
response.delete_cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE, path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/logout-everywhere")
def logout_everywhere(
request: Request,
response: Response,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
user: User = Depends(auth_mod.get_current_user),
) -> dict:
"""Revoke every token this account holds, on every device."""
auth_mod.bump_token_version(user)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
response.delete_cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE, path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH)
audit_service.record(
session, user=user.username, action="auth.logout_everywhere",
target=user.username, ip=_ip(request),
)
return {"ok": True}
@router.get("/me", response_model=UserRead)
def me(user: User = Depends(auth_mod.get_current_user)) -> User:
return user
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# User management (admin only)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def _ip(request: Request) -> str:
return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
@router.get("/users", response_model=list[UserRead])
def list_users(
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
_admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin_session),
) -> list[User]:
return session.exec(select(User).order_by(User.id)).all()
@router.post("/users", response_model=UserRead, status_code=201)
def create_user(
body: UserCreate,
request: Request,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin_session),
) -> User:
if not body.username.strip() or not body.password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Username and password required")
if auth_mod.get_user(session, body.username):
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="Username already exists")
role = body.role if body.role in ("admin", "user") else "user"
user = User(
username=body.username,
hashed_password=auth_mod.hash_password(body.password),
role=role,
)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
session.refresh(user)
audit_service.record(
session, user=admin.username, action="user.create", target=user.username,
detail=f"role={role}", ip=_ip(request),
)
return user
@router.patch("/users/{user_id}", response_model=UserRead)
def update_user(
user_id: int,
body: UserUpdate,
request: Request,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin_session),
) -> User:
user = session.get(User, user_id)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
# Guard against locking yourself out / demoting the last admin.
demoting = (body.role is not None and body.role != "admin") or body.is_active is False
if user.role == "admin" and demoting:
other_admins = session.exec(
select(User).where(User.role == "admin", User.is_active == True, User.id != user_id) # noqa: E712
).first()
if not other_admins:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot demote or disable the last active admin")
# Any of these three changes what this account is allowed to do, so the
# tokens it already holds must stop working. Without the bump a password
# reset was cosmetic: whoever had the old tokens kept full access for up to
# 30 days, and a demotion or a disable only took effect once they expired.
authority_changed = (
bool(body.password)
or (body.role is not None and body.role != user.role)
or (body.is_active is not None and body.is_active != user.is_active)
)
if body.password:
user.hashed_password = auth_mod.hash_password(body.password)
if body.role is not None:
if body.role not in ("admin", "user"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid role")
user.role = body.role
if body.is_active is not None:
user.is_active = body.is_active
if authority_changed:
auth_mod.bump_token_version(user)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
session.refresh(user)
audit_service.record(
session, user=admin.username, action="user.update", target=user.username,
ip=_ip(request),
)
return user
@router.delete("/users/{user_id}")
def delete_user(
user_id: int,
request: Request,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin_session),
) -> dict:
user = session.get(User, user_id)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
if user.id == admin.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You cannot delete your own account")
if user.role == "admin":
other_admins = session.exec(
select(User).where(User.role == "admin", User.is_active == True, User.id != user_id) # noqa: E712
).first()
if not other_admins:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot delete the last active admin")
username = user.username
session.delete(user)
session.commit()
audit_service.record(
session, user=admin.username, action="user.delete", target=username,
ip=_ip(request),
)
return {"ok": True}