menzeljandClaude Opus 5
a1cd14a1cd
The Images page knew what was running and whether it was current. It could not say whether any of it was exploitable, which is the question people actually have about a homelab full of images they pulled once and forgot. Trivy runs as a throwaway container rather than being installed into StackPilot's image, reusing the helper-container pattern backups already use for volume contents. Three reasons: a 100 MB security tool and a vulnerability database that changes weekly have no business in a release artifact, pinning SCANNER_IMAGE is then a real version control, and the scanner updates itself by pulling a newer tag. It gets the socket read-only so it inspects images the daemon already has instead of pulling them again, and a named volume for its database so the ~50 MB download happens once rather than per scan. The number the UI leads with is "fixable", not the total. A base image with 300 unfixable low-severity CVEs is not a task and a page that shows 300 in red teaches people to ignore it; three findings with a fixed version available are something to do this afternoon. Counts are stored per severity, findings are sorted worst-first and capped at 200 — every finding is counted, only the list is trimmed, so the cap can never hide the severity distribution. The failure mode this had to avoid is a security feature that reads as clean when it is broken. A scanner that cannot run stores the error and *keeps the previous counts* rather than resetting to zero, so a transient daemon problem does not silently turn a bad image green. There is a test for exactly that, and another for unparseable output. Staleness is handled the same way: the local image id is recorded with the scan, and pulling the image marks the result stale instead of presenting yesterday's numbers for today's bytes. Sweeps are deliberately serial and singly-locked. Scanning is CPU- and IO-heavy, and running eight at once on a homelab box would starve the very containers the scan is meant to protect. docker-py is synchronous, so the scan itself goes to a thread — otherwise a ten-minute scan blocks every other request on the loop. Reading results is allowed for the read-only role, which the authorization matrix made me justify in writing: CVE ids and package versions for images whose tags and compose files that role can already see, and polling them is the monitoring use case a read-only API token exists for. Running a scan stays admin-only because it spends real CPU. 20 tests against a report shaped like Trivy's real output, covering the counting, the fixable number, worst-first ordering, the cap, both failure paths, staleness, and that two sweeps cannot overlap. Verified end to end through the API as well, including that a failed rescan keeps its previous counts and shows the error. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>