Files
stackpilot/backend/services/device_service.py
T
menzeljandClaude Opus 5 54c835b032
CI / build-and-push (push) Successful in 3m53s
Close the read-side privilege escalation and fix proxy-aware IPs (0.44.0)
F1 — Any authenticated user could read any file the backend could see.
/api/files/read and /download hung on get_current_user, and the sandbox that
should have caught that was open by default: ALLOWED_BROWSE_ROOTS contained
"/", for which _is_allowed() waves through every path. So the `user` role could
download stackpilot.db (password hashes, agent tokens, backup credentials),
every stack's .env and every .secrets/* file — with no audit trail, because
only mutations were logged.

Implementing that turned up three more doors into the same room, all fixed
here since closing only the first would have made the fix cosmetic:
GET /api/stacks/{id} handed the .env to any user, /export tarred the whole
stack dir including .secrets/*, and both the agent file proxies and
/api/agents/{id}/stacks/{id} repeated the leak for every remote host. All 24
filesystem-touching routes are now admin-only; reads and downloads are audited
(listing is not — the Files page polls it). DATA_DIR is refused outright, since
the API deliberately masks agent tokens and destination secrets and the browser
would otherwise be the way around that. "/" is out of the default browse roots.

F2 — Backup destination credentials were plaintext JSON in the DB, which is
what made F1 worth exploiting. They are now Fernet-encrypted at rest behind
parse_config/dump_config, with existing rows migrated at startup.

This needed a prerequisite from F6: the key is derived from SECRET_KEY, which
was regenerated on every boot when unset. Encrypting against a key that changes
per restart would be worse than plaintext, so an auto-generated SECRET_KEY is
now persisted to ${DATA_DIR}/secret_key at mode 0600. Sessions surviving a
restart is a welcome side effect.

F3 — /api/audit is admin-only. Also hidden from the dashboard and the nav for
non-admins, so nobody polls into a 403.

F4 — uvicorn now runs with --proxy-headers, so nginx's X-Forwarded-For is
honoured. Without it request.client.host was the frontend container's IP for
every request, which made the login rate limit global instead of per-IP (10
failures locked out everyone) and filled the audit log's IP column with one
useless value.

Verified: encrypt/decrypt round-trip incl. plaintext passthrough, idempotent
re-encryption and wrong-key handling; sandbox denial for DATA_DIR, traversal
into it, and paths outside the roots, with the allowed roots still reachable.
Both against stubbed settings — there is no Docker here, so nothing was run
end to end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
2026-08-31 13:01:53 +02:00

169 lines
5.6 KiB
Python

"""Host device detection (USB, serial/TTY, DRI) and host filesystem browser."""
from __future__ import annotations
import glob
import os
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
from typing import Optional
from config import settings
@dataclass
class HostDevice:
path: str
kind: str # "usb" | "tty" | "dri" | "other"
name: str = ""
def to_dict(self) -> dict:
return asdict(self)
def _read(path: str) -> str:
try:
with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as fh:
return fh.read().strip()
except OSError:
return ""
def _usb_devices() -> list[HostDevice]:
devices: list[HostDevice] = []
# /dev/bus/usb/<bus>/<dev>
for path in sorted(glob.glob("/dev/bus/usb/*/*")):
name = ""
# Best-effort name lookup via sysfs is non-trivial to map; leave generic.
devices.append(HostDevice(path=path, kind="usb", name=name or "USB device"))
return devices
def _usb_names_from_sysfs() -> list[HostDevice]:
"""Richer USB list from sysfs with product/manufacturer strings."""
out: list[HostDevice] = []
for dev in sorted(glob.glob("/sys/bus/usb/devices/*")):
busnum = _read(os.path.join(dev, "busnum"))
devnum = _read(os.path.join(dev, "devnum"))
if not busnum or not devnum:
continue
product = _read(os.path.join(dev, "product"))
manufacturer = _read(os.path.join(dev, "manufacturer"))
label = " ".join(p for p in (manufacturer, product) if p) or "USB device"
path = f"/dev/bus/usb/{int(busnum):03d}/{int(devnum):03d}"
out.append(HostDevice(path=path, kind="usb", name=label))
return out
def _tty_devices() -> list[HostDevice]:
devices: list[HostDevice] = []
patterns = ["/dev/ttyUSB*", "/dev/ttyACM*", "/dev/ttyAMA*", "/dev/serial/by-id/*"]
for pattern in patterns:
for path in sorted(glob.glob(pattern)):
base = os.path.basename(path)
driver = _read(f"/sys/class/tty/{base}/device/driver/module/name") or ""
devices.append(
HostDevice(path=path, kind="tty", name=driver or "Serial device")
)
return devices
def _dri_devices() -> list[HostDevice]:
return [
HostDevice(path=p, kind="dri", name="GPU render node")
for p in sorted(glob.glob("/dev/dri/*"))
]
def detect_devices() -> dict:
usb = _usb_names_from_sysfs() or _usb_devices()
return {
"usb": [d.to_dict() for d in usb],
"tty": [d.to_dict() for d in _tty_devices()],
"dri": [d.to_dict() for d in _dri_devices()],
}
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Host filesystem browser (sandboxed)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class BrowseError(Exception):
pass
def _real_root(path: str) -> str:
"""Map a logical host path into the container view (HOST_ROOT_PREFIX).
Refuses anything that resolves inside StackPilot's own ``DATA_DIR``. That
directory holds ``stackpilot.db`` — users, password hashes, agent tokens and
backup-destination credentials — and the API deliberately never hands those
out (``AgentRead.token_set`` is a bool, destination secrets come back
masked). Without this the file browser would be a way around that, for
admins too. Note this only bites when ``HOST_ROOT_PREFIX`` is empty: with a
prefix set, no logical path can reach the container's own ``/data`` at all.
"""
prefix = settings.HOST_ROOT_PREFIX.rstrip("/")
real = prefix + path if prefix else path
data_dir = os.path.normpath(settings.DATA_DIR)
norm = os.path.normpath(real)
if norm == data_dir or norm.startswith(data_dir + os.sep):
raise BrowseError("Path is inside StackPilot's own data directory")
return real
def _is_allowed(path: str) -> bool:
norm = os.path.normpath(path)
for root in settings.ALLOWED_BROWSE_ROOTS:
root = os.path.normpath(root)
if root == "/" or norm == root or norm.startswith(root + os.sep):
return True
return False
def browse(path: str = "/", show_hidden: bool = False) -> dict:
path = os.path.normpath(path or "/")
if not path.startswith("/"):
raise BrowseError("Path must be absolute")
if not _is_allowed(path):
raise BrowseError("Path is outside the allowed browse roots")
real = _real_root(path)
if not os.path.isdir(real):
raise BrowseError(f"Not a directory: {path}")
entries = []
try:
names = os.listdir(real)
except PermissionError as exc:
raise BrowseError(f"Permission denied: {path}") from exc
for name in sorted(names):
if not show_hidden and name.startswith("."):
continue
full_real = os.path.join(real, name)
try:
st = os.lstat(full_real)
is_dir = os.path.isdir(full_real)
entries.append(
{
"name": name,
"type": "dir" if is_dir else "file",
"size": st.st_size if not is_dir else None,
"permissions": oct(st.st_mode & 0o777),
"mtime": st.st_mtime,
"symlink": os.path.islink(full_real),
}
)
except OSError:
continue
# Sort: dirs first, then files, both alphabetical.
entries.sort(key=lambda e: (e["type"] != "dir", e["name"].lower()))
parent = os.path.dirname(path) if path != "/" else None
return {
"path": path,
"parent": parent,
"roots": settings.ALLOWED_BROWSE_ROOTS,
"entries": entries,
}