menzeljandClaude Opus 5
54c835b032
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F1 — Any authenticated user could read any file the backend could see.
/api/files/read and /download hung on get_current_user, and the sandbox that
should have caught that was open by default: ALLOWED_BROWSE_ROOTS contained
"/", for which _is_allowed() waves through every path. So the `user` role could
download stackpilot.db (password hashes, agent tokens, backup credentials),
every stack's .env and every .secrets/* file — with no audit trail, because
only mutations were logged.
Implementing that turned up three more doors into the same room, all fixed
here since closing only the first would have made the fix cosmetic:
GET /api/stacks/{id} handed the .env to any user, /export tarred the whole
stack dir including .secrets/*, and both the agent file proxies and
/api/agents/{id}/stacks/{id} repeated the leak for every remote host. All 24
filesystem-touching routes are now admin-only; reads and downloads are audited
(listing is not — the Files page polls it). DATA_DIR is refused outright, since
the API deliberately masks agent tokens and destination secrets and the browser
would otherwise be the way around that. "/" is out of the default browse roots.
F2 — Backup destination credentials were plaintext JSON in the DB, which is
what made F1 worth exploiting. They are now Fernet-encrypted at rest behind
parse_config/dump_config, with existing rows migrated at startup.
This needed a prerequisite from F6: the key is derived from SECRET_KEY, which
was regenerated on every boot when unset. Encrypting against a key that changes
per restart would be worse than plaintext, so an auto-generated SECRET_KEY is
now persisted to ${DATA_DIR}/secret_key at mode 0600. Sessions surviving a
restart is a welcome side effect.
F3 — /api/audit is admin-only. Also hidden from the dashboard and the nav for
non-admins, so nobody polls into a 403.
F4 — uvicorn now runs with --proxy-headers, so nginx's X-Forwarded-For is
honoured. Without it request.client.host was the frontend container's IP for
every request, which made the login rate limit global instead of per-IP (10
failures locked out everyone) and filled the audit log's IP column with one
useless value.
Verified: encrypt/decrypt round-trip incl. plaintext passthrough, idempotent
re-encryption and wrong-key handling; sandbox denial for DATA_DIR, traversal
into it, and paths outside the roots, with the allowed roots still reachable.
Both against stubbed settings — there is no Docker here, so nothing was run
end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
77 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
77 lines
2.6 KiB
Python
"""Symmetric encryption for secrets that have to live in the database.
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Most of StackPilot's secrets are files on disk (``.env``, ``.secrets/*``) where
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filesystem permissions are the right control. A few can't be: backup
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destination credentials and agent tokens are needed by background jobs, so they
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sit in ``stackpilot.db``. This module encrypts those at rest.
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The key is derived from ``SECRET_KEY`` rather than being a second thing to
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configure — which is exactly why ``SECRET_KEY`` is now persisted (see
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``config._ensure_secret``): a key that changed on every restart would take the
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ciphertext with it.
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Ciphertext is stored with an ``enc:v1:`` prefix so plaintext rows written by
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older versions stay recognisable and can be migrated in place.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import logging
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from typing import Optional
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from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, InvalidToken
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from config import settings
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logger = logging.getLogger("stackpilot.crypto")
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PREFIX = "enc:v1:"
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_INFO = b"stackpilot-db-field-encryption-v1"
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class DecryptError(Exception):
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"""Ciphertext could not be decrypted (usually: SECRET_KEY changed)."""
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def _fernet() -> Fernet:
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"""Fernet built from a 32-byte key derived from SECRET_KEY.
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Not cached: SECRET_KEY is fixed for the process lifetime, and building a
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Fernet is a hash plus a base64 encode — cheap enough not to bother.
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"""
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digest = hashlib.blake2b(
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settings.SECRET_KEY.encode("utf-8"), key=_INFO, digest_size=32
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).digest()
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return Fernet(base64.urlsafe_b64encode(digest))
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def is_encrypted(value: Optional[str]) -> bool:
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return bool(value) and value.startswith(PREFIX)
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def encrypt(plaintext: str) -> str:
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"""Encrypt a string. Already-encrypted input is returned unchanged."""
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if is_encrypted(plaintext):
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return plaintext
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token = _fernet().encrypt((plaintext or "").encode("utf-8"))
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return PREFIX + token.decode("ascii")
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def decrypt(value: str) -> str:
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"""Decrypt a value written by :func:`encrypt`.
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Plaintext (no prefix) is passed straight through, so rows written before
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encryption existed keep working until the startup migration rewrites them.
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"""
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if not is_encrypted(value):
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return value or ""
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try:
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return _fernet().decrypt(value[len(PREFIX):].encode("ascii")).decode("utf-8")
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except (InvalidToken, ValueError) as exc:
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raise DecryptError(
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"Could not decrypt a stored secret. This normally means SECRET_KEY "
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"changed since it was saved — restore the old key, or re-enter the "
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"affected credentials."
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) from exc
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