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stackpilot/backend/routers/auth.py
T
menzeljandClaude Opus 5 41a21b5a25
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Make tokens revocable and move the refresh token out of localStorage (0.46.0)
F5 — A token was valid until it expired, full stop. Resetting a compromised
account's password changed nothing for whoever held its tokens (up to 30 days
for a refresh token), demoting or disabling an account only took effect once
the same clock ran out, and logout was purely client-side.

Every account now has a token_version, every token is minted carrying it, and
every request compares the two. Bumping it is the revoke switch, pulled on the
three changes that alter what an account may do: password, role, active flag.
"Sign out everywhere" in the user menu bumps your own. Plain "Sign out" only
drops the cookie, because signing out on your phone should not kill your
desktop session.

The refresh token left localStorage for an httpOnly cookie (SameSite=Lax,
scoped to /api/auth), and the access token is now held in memory only. A
successful XSS can still act inside the open page but can no longer walk off
with 30 days of access. The cookie is marked Secure only when the request
arrived over HTTPS — request.url.scheme is trustworthy since the F4 fix — so a
plain-HTTP homelab keeps working. Any refresh token an older build left in
localStorage is deleted on first load. Scripted clients that cannot hold a
cookie can still ask for it in the body with ?in_body=true.

F9 comes with it, as predicted: the WebSocket helpers read the role off the
live user instead of the token's claim. /ws/exec is root-equivalent on the
host, and a token minted while the account was an admin stayed syntactically
valid after a demotion.

The sharp edge was the migration, not the feature. _ensure_model_columns emits
ADD COLUMN without a DEFAULT, so SQLite would have filled token_version with
NULL on every existing install, every version check would have failed against
it, and the upgrade would have locked out every user everywhere. The helper now
renders NOT NULL DEFAULT <literal> for scalar defaults; test_schema_migration
builds a genuinely old-shaped user table and asserts the backfill. The version
comparison also tolerates NULL as 1, so a database migrated by some other route
still works.

Writing that test surfaced an undocumented precondition: _ensure_model_columns
does nothing unless `models` has been imported, since SQLModel.metadata is
empty until then. It holds in production because init_db imports first; now it
says so.

The authorization matrix did its job — adding two auth routes failed the suite
until both were classified, which is exactly the review moment it exists for.

30 new tests (698 total). Upgrading signs everyone out once.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
2026-08-31 13:31:00 +02:00

325 lines
11 KiB
Python

"""Authentication routes + first-launch setup wizard."""
from __future__ import annotations
import time
from collections import defaultdict, deque
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
from sqlmodel import Session, select
import auth as auth_mod
from database import get_session
from models.user import (
LoginRequest,
RefreshRequest,
TokenPair,
User,
UserCreate,
UserRead,
UserUpdate,
)
from config import settings
from services import audit_service
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
# Simple in-memory rate limiter for login (max 10 / minute / IP).
_LOGIN_HITS: dict[str, deque] = defaultdict(deque)
_RATE_LIMIT = 10
_RATE_WINDOW = 60.0
def _check_rate_limit(ip: str) -> None:
now = time.monotonic()
hits = _LOGIN_HITS[ip]
while hits and now - hits[0] > _RATE_WINDOW:
hits.popleft()
if len(hits) >= _RATE_LIMIT:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
detail="Too many login attempts, slow down.",
)
hits.append(now)
#: The refresh cookie is scoped to the two endpoints that consume it, so it is
#: not attached to every API call the way a "/" cookie would be.
REFRESH_COOKIE = "stackpilot_refresh"
REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH = "/api/auth"
def _issue(
user: User, response: Response, request: Request, in_body: bool = False
) -> TokenPair:
"""Mint a token pair, putting the refresh token in an httpOnly cookie.
Keeping the long-lived token out of JavaScript's reach means a successful
XSS can no longer walk off with 30 days of access — it is limited to
whatever it can do in the live page. The short-lived access token still
goes to the client, which holds it in memory only.
``in_body`` returns it in the response as well, for scripted clients that
have no cookie jar.
"""
refresh = auth_mod.create_refresh_token(user)
response.set_cookie(
REFRESH_COOKIE,
refresh,
max_age=settings.REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRE_DAYS * 24 * 3600,
httponly=True,
# Lax rather than Strict so following a link into StackPilot keeps you
# signed in; the cookie is only ever read by same-site POSTs anyway.
samesite="lax",
# Only when the request actually arrived over TLS — marking it Secure on
# a plain-HTTP homelab deployment would make the browser drop it and
# nobody could stay signed in. request.url.scheme is trustworthy here
# because uvicorn runs with --proxy-headers.
secure=request.url.scheme == "https",
path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH,
)
return TokenPair(
access_token=auth_mod.create_access_token(user),
refresh_token=refresh if in_body else None,
)
@router.get("/needs-setup")
def needs_setup(session: Session = Depends(get_session)) -> dict:
"""First-launch wizard check: True if no users exist yet."""
return {"needs_setup": not auth_mod.users_exist(session)}
@router.post("/setup", response_model=TokenPair)
def setup(
body: UserCreate,
request: Request,
response: Response,
in_body: bool = False,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> TokenPair:
if auth_mod.users_exist(session):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Setup already completed")
user = User(
username=body.username,
hashed_password=auth_mod.hash_password(body.password),
role="admin",
)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
session.refresh(user)
audit_service.record(
session, user=user.username, action="user.setup", target=user.username
)
return _issue(user, response, request, in_body)
@router.post("/login", response_model=TokenPair)
def login(
body: LoginRequest,
request: Request,
response: Response,
in_body: bool = False,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> TokenPair:
ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
_check_rate_limit(ip)
user = auth_mod.authenticate(session, body.username, body.password)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Incorrect username or password",
)
audit_service.record(
session, user=user.username, action="auth.login", target=user.username, ip=ip
)
return _issue(user, response, request, in_body)
@router.post("/refresh", response_model=TokenPair)
def refresh(
request: Request,
response: Response,
body: RefreshRequest | None = None,
in_body: bool = False,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
) -> TokenPair:
"""Exchange a refresh token for a fresh pair.
Reads the httpOnly cookie; a body is accepted as a fallback for clients
that cannot hold one. The token is re-validated against the live user, so a
password reset or a disabled account takes effect here too rather than at
the end of the token's 30-day life.
"""
token = request.cookies.get(REFRESH_COOKIE) or (body.refresh_token if body else None)
if not token:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="No refresh token"
)
payload = auth_mod.decode_token(token, "refresh")
user = auth_mod.resolve_token_user(session, payload)
if not user:
response.delete_cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE, path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Session is no longer valid — sign in again",
)
return _issue(user, response, request, in_body)
@router.post("/logout")
def logout(request: Request, response: Response) -> dict:
"""End the session on this device by dropping the refresh cookie.
Deliberately does not bump ``token_version``: signing out on your phone
should not kill the session on your desktop. Use "sign out everywhere"
for that. The access token is held in memory by the client and dies with
the tab; it stays technically valid for the rest of its hour, which is why
it is short-lived.
"""
response.delete_cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE, path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH)
return {"ok": True}
@router.post("/logout-everywhere")
def logout_everywhere(
request: Request,
response: Response,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
user: User = Depends(auth_mod.get_current_user),
) -> dict:
"""Revoke every token this account holds, on every device."""
auth_mod.bump_token_version(user)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
response.delete_cookie(REFRESH_COOKIE, path=REFRESH_COOKIE_PATH)
audit_service.record(
session, user=user.username, action="auth.logout_everywhere",
target=user.username, ip=_ip(request),
)
return {"ok": True}
@router.get("/me", response_model=UserRead)
def me(user: User = Depends(auth_mod.get_current_user)) -> User:
return user
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# User management (admin only)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def _ip(request: Request) -> str:
return request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
@router.get("/users", response_model=list[UserRead])
def list_users(
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
_admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin),
) -> list[User]:
return session.exec(select(User).order_by(User.id)).all()
@router.post("/users", response_model=UserRead, status_code=201)
def create_user(
body: UserCreate,
request: Request,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin),
) -> User:
if not body.username.strip() or not body.password:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Username and password required")
if auth_mod.get_user(session, body.username):
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="Username already exists")
role = body.role if body.role in ("admin", "user") else "user"
user = User(
username=body.username,
hashed_password=auth_mod.hash_password(body.password),
role=role,
)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
session.refresh(user)
audit_service.record(
session, user=admin.username, action="user.create", target=user.username,
detail=f"role={role}", ip=_ip(request),
)
return user
@router.patch("/users/{user_id}", response_model=UserRead)
def update_user(
user_id: int,
body: UserUpdate,
request: Request,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin),
) -> User:
user = session.get(User, user_id)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
# Guard against locking yourself out / demoting the last admin.
demoting = (body.role is not None and body.role != "admin") or body.is_active is False
if user.role == "admin" and demoting:
other_admins = session.exec(
select(User).where(User.role == "admin", User.is_active == True, User.id != user_id) # noqa: E712
).first()
if not other_admins:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot demote or disable the last active admin")
# Any of these three changes what this account is allowed to do, so the
# tokens it already holds must stop working. Without the bump a password
# reset was cosmetic: whoever had the old tokens kept full access for up to
# 30 days, and a demotion or a disable only took effect once they expired.
authority_changed = (
bool(body.password)
or (body.role is not None and body.role != user.role)
or (body.is_active is not None and body.is_active != user.is_active)
)
if body.password:
user.hashed_password = auth_mod.hash_password(body.password)
if body.role is not None:
if body.role not in ("admin", "user"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid role")
user.role = body.role
if body.is_active is not None:
user.is_active = body.is_active
if authority_changed:
auth_mod.bump_token_version(user)
session.add(user)
session.commit()
session.refresh(user)
audit_service.record(
session, user=admin.username, action="user.update", target=user.username,
ip=_ip(request),
)
return user
@router.delete("/users/{user_id}")
def delete_user(
user_id: int,
request: Request,
session: Session = Depends(get_session),
admin: User = Depends(auth_mod.require_admin),
) -> dict:
user = session.get(User, user_id)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
if user.id == admin.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You cannot delete your own account")
if user.role == "admin":
other_admins = session.exec(
select(User).where(User.role == "admin", User.is_active == True, User.id != user_id) # noqa: E712
).first()
if not other_admins:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot delete the last active admin")
username = user.username
session.delete(user)
session.commit()
audit_service.record(
session, user=admin.username, action="user.delete", target=username,
ip=_ip(request),
)
return {"ok": True}