4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
menzeljandClaude Opus 5.5	d6cebb3371	Fix what a review of the whole app found, end to end (0.67.1) ... A pass over every feature against a real Docker daemon, then clicking through the UI as admin and read-only user, on a desktop and a phone. Security. /ws/deploy ran compose up for the read-only role; it is admin-only now. A container's inspect view, a stack's compose file (POSTGRES_PASSWORD: hunter2) and the viewer's .env tab no longer show credentials to that role. Git branch and URL values that git would read as options (-x, ext::) are refused. SFTP host keys are checked: pinned on first use or entered by hand (key line or SHA256 fingerprint), a different key is refused before the password is sent. A backup name from the API can no longer reach outside the destination folder. The file browser refuses to move or rename a browse root, as delete did. Docker lifecycle. Closing the deploy console released the stack lock while compose was still running and logged rc=None as success; deploys and updates are now background runs that hold the lock to the end, report the real exit code and can be re-attached to. Every closed log view left a `compose logs -f` behind. A dozen open tabs exhausted the default thread pool and hung the API; event and exec streams have their own threads. Auto-update and the update endpoint ignored failed pulls. A deleted git stack was recreated and started by the next webhook or poll; deleting a stack now drops its git source, auto-update policy and schedule entries. Deleting no longer walks into mounted shares, is refused while a backup runs, and removes the containers even when the compose file is broken. Stack folders compose has to normalise (Nextcloud -> nextcloud) work everywhere and group correctly on the volumes, networks and images pages. Detection. Host port conflicts read the container's own network namespace; /proc/1/net is read instead. Images referenced as docker.io/… were never update-checked; local builds no longer report "needs credentials". NVIDIA GPUs are read from the driver's procfs. The backup dialog's "path mismatch" warning came from mountinfo's filesystem-relative root and fired for any stacks folder on its own disk, ZFS dataset or btrfs subvolume; the host path now comes from Docker's mounts. Backups and destinations. The download ignored the folder/volume selection (axios sent binds[]). Restoring under a new name kept the old one. A report header past nginx's buffer turned a good backup into a 502. SFTP/S3 errors were bare 500s and "Test" did not try to write. A destination used by a schedule could be deleted. Backup file names are in the schedule's or the browser's time zone instead of UTC. Editor and converter. `docker run` conversion produced invalid compose for --network host, named volumes and -dit; --gpus and --mount were dropped; a multi-line command pasted into the one-line field became `image: ' '` (now a textarea, and flattened continuations are read). Validation failed for env_file stacks. The editor overwrote unsaved edits on every container event, lost them on a stray click (now asks), threw when closing the diff, and its helper panel listed the starter service "app" for every existing stack. Monaco is bundled instead of loaded from jsdelivr, so the editor works offline (and monaco-editor 0.57 drops the dompurify advisory; axios and react-router updated). UI. All times were two hours off: offset-less UTC from SQLite was read as local time, and "next run" always said "just now". A token refresh mid-session duplicated deploys, reset terminals and doubled logs. A backend restart (update, self-update) signed everyone out on reload; the page now waits for it. The editor was unusable on a phone, tables and tabs overflowed, dialog text was black on the dark theme, and the file browser opened on an error with the default roots. Read-only users get "Admin only" pages instead of 403s; in-use networks offer no delete; "Scan all" covers StackPilot's own stacks only and runs in the background instead of timing out at 600s. Deployment. nginx passes the port in Host (the OIDC redirect URI lost :5009) and keeps an outer proxy's X-Forwarded-Proto. The frontend waits for a healthy backend (healthcheck probes every 2s while starting). The frontend image builds with npm ci. Secrets are 0644 in a 0700 folder so non-root containers can read them; existing files are fixed at startup. The test suite no longer starts real containers on a host with Docker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fx7gcuy8d6nPd95g43rGHu	2026-10-15 13:51:26 +02:00
menzeljandClaude Opus 5	8edea8f971	Add OIDC single sign-on, configured from Settings (0.60.0) ... Authorization Code with PKCE against any provider that publishes a discovery document, configured entirely from the UI — no environment variables, no restart to fix a typo in a client id, and a Test button that fetches the provider's metadata and says what it found. The best decision here was not writing any new session machinery. The callback sets the same httpOnly refresh cookie a password login sets and redirects to "/", and the SPA's existing boot-time restore() trades it for an access token. So an SSO session *is* a normal session — same revocation, same token_version checks, same everything — and no token is ever put in a URL fragment or query string where a proxy log or the browser history would keep it. The alternative everyone reaches for first, redirecting with #access_token=..., would have been a second code path and a worse one. What is actually verified, because "the provider said so" is worth nothing otherwise: the ID token's signature against the provider's published JWKS (re-fetched once if the kid is unknown, so key rotation heals itself), issuer, audience, expiry, and a nonce minted for that specific login. The state row is deleted when it is consumed, which is what makes a replayed callback fail, and it lives in the database rather than a dict so it survives the worker restart that can happen between the redirect out and the redirect back. Accounts match on sub, not username. It is the only identifier a provider promises is stable, so somebody renamed upstream stays the same account instead of silently acquiring a second one. An existing local account with that username is linked rather than duplicated, and keeps its role — linking must not quietly demote an admin. Claim-based admin mapping works in both directions: removed from the group upstream means read-only on the next sign-in. Two things this turned up that were already broken. verify_password raised passlib's UnknownHashError on a hash it could not parse, so a password attempt against an SSO account — which stores a deliberately unusable marker — would have been a 500 rather than a 401; it now returns false for any unparseable hash, which is the right answer for a corrupt row too. And the bundled nginx never forwarded X-Forwarded-Proto, so uvicorn saw plain HTTP behind TLS: the derived redirect URI came out as http:// and the refresh cookie lost its Secure flag. Both fixed. The password form stays on the login screen no matter what. A provider outage locking you out of the machine that runs your provider is a failure mode worth designing against. The authorization matrix made me write down why three routes are public, which is the right question to be asked: they are the path by which an unauthenticated person becomes an authenticated one. status deliberately returns only a boolean and a label — no issuer, no client id — so it tells a stranger nothing the button would not. 31 tests, with a throwaway RSA key standing in for a provider so verification is exercised for real rather than mocked: wrong key under the right kid, wrong audience, wrong issuer, expired, replayed nonce, reused state. Plus an end-to-end run of the whole flow — redirect, callback, cookie, session, group-mapped admin, replay refused, password login against the SSO account cleanly refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-18 01:29:15 +02:00
menzeljandClaude Opus 4.8	8d19b09abd	Phase 4: backups w/ volumes, notifications, settings & users, audit page (0.4.0) ... - Backup/restore: per-stack tar.gz incl. named-volume snapshots (helper container), upload restore with rename/overwrite/conflict detection. - Notifications: ntfy/Discord/Slack/Gotify/generic webhooks, per-event subscriptions; wired into the update checker and stack lifecycle. - Settings page: update-check interval, webhook CRUD + test, user management (with last-admin safeguards). - Audit log page (searchable, paginated). - Mobile-responsive sidebar/layout. Multi-host agents and remote backup destinations (SFTP/S3) deferred. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-07 20:58:05 +00:00
menzeljandClaude Opus 4.8	f732cb080b	Initial commit: StackPilot Phase 1 (Core) ... Self-hosted Docker Compose manager. - Backend: FastAPI + docker-py + SQLite (JWT auth, file-first stacks, lifecycle, live status, WebSocket logs, docker-run converter, audit log) - Frontend: React + Vite + Tailwind (login/setup, dashboard, stacks, stack detail, Monaco editor, dark/light theme) - Deployment: docker-compose.yml, Dockerfiles, nginx reverse proxy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-07 16:04:58 +00:00