d6cebb337109616dab2d42955f43633c02479073
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 menzeljandClaude Opus 5.5
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d6cebb3371 |
Fix what a review of the whole app found, end to end (0.67.1)
A pass over every feature against a real Docker daemon, then clicking through the UI as admin and read-only user, on a desktop and a phone. Security. /ws/deploy ran compose up for the read-only role; it is admin-only now. A container's inspect view, a stack's compose file (POSTGRES_PASSWORD: hunter2) and the viewer's .env tab no longer show credentials to that role. Git branch and URL values that git would read as options (-x, ext::) are refused. SFTP host keys are checked: pinned on first use or entered by hand (key line or SHA256 fingerprint), a different key is refused before the password is sent. A backup name from the API can no longer reach outside the destination folder. The file browser refuses to move or rename a browse root, as delete did. Docker lifecycle. Closing the deploy console released the stack lock while compose was still running and logged rc=None as success; deploys and updates are now background runs that hold the lock to the end, report the real exit code and can be re-attached to. Every closed log view left a `compose logs -f` behind. A dozen open tabs exhausted the default thread pool and hung the API; event and exec streams have their own threads. Auto-update and the update endpoint ignored failed pulls. A deleted git stack was recreated and started by the next webhook or poll; deleting a stack now drops its git source, auto-update policy and schedule entries. Deleting no longer walks into mounted shares, is refused while a backup runs, and removes the containers even when the compose file is broken. Stack folders compose has to normalise (Nextcloud -> nextcloud) work everywhere and group correctly on the volumes, networks and images pages. Detection. Host port conflicts read the container's own network namespace; /proc/1/net is read instead. Images referenced as docker.io/… were never update-checked; local builds no longer report "needs credentials". NVIDIA GPUs are read from the driver's procfs. The backup dialog's "path mismatch" warning came from mountinfo's filesystem-relative root and fired for any stacks folder on its own disk, ZFS dataset or btrfs subvolume; the host path now comes from Docker's mounts. Backups and destinations. The download ignored the folder/volume selection (axios sent binds[]). Restoring under a new name kept the old one. A report header past nginx's buffer turned a good backup into a 502. SFTP/S3 errors were bare 500s and "Test" did not try to write. A destination used by a schedule could be deleted. Backup file names are in the schedule's or the browser's time zone instead of UTC. Editor and converter. `docker run` conversion produced invalid compose for --network host, named volumes and -dit; --gpus and --mount were dropped; a multi-line command pasted into the one-line field became `image: ' '` (now a textarea, and flattened continuations are read). Validation failed for env_file stacks. The editor overwrote unsaved edits on every container event, lost them on a stray click (now asks), threw when closing the diff, and its helper panel listed the starter service "app" for every existing stack. Monaco is bundled instead of loaded from jsdelivr, so the editor works offline (and monaco-editor 0.57 drops the dompurify advisory; axios and react-router updated). UI. All times were two hours off: offset-less UTC from SQLite was read as local time, and "next run" always said "just now". A token refresh mid-session duplicated deploys, reset terminals and doubled logs. A backend restart (update, self-update) signed everyone out on reload; the page now waits for it. The editor was unusable on a phone, tables and tabs overflowed, dialog text was black on the dark theme, and the file browser opened on an error with the default roots. Read-only users get "Admin only" pages instead of 403s; in-use networks offer no delete; "Scan all" covers StackPilot's own stacks only and runs in the background instead of timing out at 600s. Deployment. nginx passes the port in Host (the OIDC redirect URI lost :5009) and keeps an outer proxy's X-Forwarded-Proto. The frontend waits for a healthy backend (healthcheck probes every 2s while starting). The frontend image builds with npm ci. Secrets are 0644 in a 0700 folder so non-root containers can read them; existing files are fixed at startup. The test suite no longer starts real containers on a host with Docker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fx7gcuy8d6nPd95g43rGHu |
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menzeljandClaude Opus 5
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9247ff9621 |
Deploy stacks from a Git repository (0.58.0)
StackPilot's stacks were already plain folders on disk, which makes GitOps less
of an architectural change than it would be elsewhere: a sync is "make these
files match that repo, then compose up". Almost all of the design effort went
into the word "these", because getting it wrong destroys data.
A stack folder is not just the compose file. Compose creates bind-mount
directories in it — ./config, ./data — and those hold the live state of whatever
is running. So the obvious implementation, clone into the stack folder and
git reset --hard, is a data-loss bug waiting for its first `git clean`. Instead
the clone lives in a cache under ${DATA_DIR}/git/<stack> where reset and clean
are safe, and the configured subtree is copied across. No .git ends up in the
stack folder, so backups and the file browser are unaffected too.
Deletion is the other half. Making a folder "match" a repo naively means
removing what the repo does not have, which is exactly the application data
above. So each sync records the paths it wrote, and the next sync may delete
only those — a file the repository never provided cannot be touched by any code
path here. Tested directly: a database file and a hand-written .env survive a
sync that replaces the compose file and removes a file the repo dropped.
What the repo does provide is overwritten, hand edits included. That is the
point of GitOps rather than a wart, but it is a surprise if you attach a repo to
a stack you have been editing, so the connect form says it before the first sync
and the first sync is never automatic.
The webhook is the only route in StackPilot with no bearer token, because a Git
forge has none to present. It authenticates with an HMAC over the body —
X-Hub-Signature-256 for GitHub/Gitea/Forgejo, X-Gitlab-Token for GitLab, both
compared in constant time — and answers 404, not 403, to anything unsigned. A
403 would confirm that a given stack exists and is connected to a repository,
which an unauthenticated caller has not earned. The authorization matrix test
caught this route being public and made me write that reasoning down in it,
which is exactly what that test is for.
Credentials never reach a command line: ps is readable by every process on the
host, and this runs in a container next to everything else. The HTTPS token goes
to git through GIT_ASKPASS and the environment, the SSH key through a 0600 file
kept outside the working tree, and everything git prints is scrubbed of both —
plus any credential-carrying URL — before it is stored in last_error or shown.
Auto-deploy takes the same per-stack lock as every other lifecycle action, so a
webhook firing mid-deploy reports "files synced, stack busy" instead of racing a
second compose run at the same project.
The image needed git and openssh-client, which is the only reason this release
touches the Dockerfile.
26 tests against real repositories created with the real git binary, none of
them touching the network — mocking git would mostly test the mock. Verified end
to end as well: connect, sync, a push that changes one file and deletes another,
a wrongly signed webhook, a correctly signed one, and the live data still there
afterwards.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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menzeljandClaude Opus 5
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54c835b032 |
Close the read-side privilege escalation and fix proxy-aware IPs (0.44.0)
CI / build-and-push (push) Successful in 3m53s
F1 — Any authenticated user could read any file the backend could see.
/api/files/read and /download hung on get_current_user, and the sandbox that
should have caught that was open by default: ALLOWED_BROWSE_ROOTS contained
"/", for which _is_allowed() waves through every path. So the `user` role could
download stackpilot.db (password hashes, agent tokens, backup credentials),
every stack's .env and every .secrets/* file — with no audit trail, because
only mutations were logged.
Implementing that turned up three more doors into the same room, all fixed
here since closing only the first would have made the fix cosmetic:
GET /api/stacks/{id} handed the .env to any user, /export tarred the whole
stack dir including .secrets/*, and both the agent file proxies and
/api/agents/{id}/stacks/{id} repeated the leak for every remote host. All 24
filesystem-touching routes are now admin-only; reads and downloads are audited
(listing is not — the Files page polls it). DATA_DIR is refused outright, since
the API deliberately masks agent tokens and destination secrets and the browser
would otherwise be the way around that. "/" is out of the default browse roots.
F2 — Backup destination credentials were plaintext JSON in the DB, which is
what made F1 worth exploiting. They are now Fernet-encrypted at rest behind
parse_config/dump_config, with existing rows migrated at startup.
This needed a prerequisite from F6: the key is derived from SECRET_KEY, which
was regenerated on every boot when unset. Encrypting against a key that changes
per restart would be worse than plaintext, so an auto-generated SECRET_KEY is
now persisted to ${DATA_DIR}/secret_key at mode 0600. Sessions surviving a
restart is a welcome side effect.
F3 — /api/audit is admin-only. Also hidden from the dashboard and the nav for
non-admins, so nobody polls into a 403.
F4 — uvicorn now runs with --proxy-headers, so nginx's X-Forwarded-For is
honoured. Without it request.client.host was the frontend container's IP for
every request, which made the login rate limit global instead of per-IP (10
failures locked out everyone) and filled the audit log's IP column with one
useless value.
Verified: encrypt/decrypt round-trip incl. plaintext passthrough, idempotent
re-encryption and wrong-key handling; sandbox denial for DATA_DIR, traversal
into it, and paths outside the roots, with the allowed roots still reachable.
Both against stubbed settings — there is no Docker here, so nothing was run
end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
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menzeljandClaude Opus 4.8
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f732cb080b |
Initial commit: StackPilot Phase 1 (Core)
Self-hosted Docker Compose manager. - Backend: FastAPI + docker-py + SQLite (JWT auth, file-first stacks, lifecycle, live status, WebSocket logs, docker-run converter, audit log) - Frontend: React + Vite + Tailwind (login/setup, dashboard, stacks, stack detail, Monaco editor, dark/light theme) - Deployment: docker-compose.yml, Dockerfiles, nginx reverse proxy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |