The Images page knew what was running and whether it was current. It could not
say whether any of it was exploitable, which is the question people actually
have about a homelab full of images they pulled once and forgot.
Trivy runs as a throwaway container rather than being installed into
StackPilot's image, reusing the helper-container pattern backups already use for
volume contents. Three reasons: a 100 MB security tool and a vulnerability
database that changes weekly have no business in a release artifact, pinning
SCANNER_IMAGE is then a real version control, and the scanner updates itself by
pulling a newer tag. It gets the socket read-only so it inspects images the
daemon already has instead of pulling them again, and a named volume for its
database so the ~50 MB download happens once rather than per scan.
The number the UI leads with is "fixable", not the total. A base image with 300
unfixable low-severity CVEs is not a task and a page that shows 300 in red
teaches people to ignore it; three findings with a fixed version available are
something to do this afternoon. Counts are stored per severity, findings are
sorted worst-first and capped at 200 — every finding is counted, only the list
is trimmed, so the cap can never hide the severity distribution.
The failure mode this had to avoid is a security feature that reads as clean
when it is broken. A scanner that cannot run stores the error and *keeps the
previous counts* rather than resetting to zero, so a transient daemon problem
does not silently turn a bad image green. There is a test for exactly that, and
another for unparseable output. Staleness is handled the same way: the local
image id is recorded with the scan, and pulling the image marks the result stale
instead of presenting yesterday's numbers for today's bytes.
Sweeps are deliberately serial and singly-locked. Scanning is CPU- and IO-heavy,
and running eight at once on a homelab box would starve the very containers the
scan is meant to protect. docker-py is synchronous, so the scan itself goes to a
thread — otherwise a ten-minute scan blocks every other request on the loop.
Reading results is allowed for the read-only role, which the authorization
matrix made me justify in writing: CVE ids and package versions for images whose
tags and compose files that role can already see, and polling them is the
monitoring use case a read-only API token exists for. Running a scan stays
admin-only because it spends real CPU.
20 tests against a report shaped like Trivy's real output, covering the counting,
the fixable number, worst-first ordering, the cap, both failure paths, staleness,
and that two sweeps cannot overlap. Verified end to end through the API as well,
including that a failed rescan keeps its previous counts and shows the error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
StackPilot's stacks were already plain folders on disk, which makes GitOps less
of an architectural change than it would be elsewhere: a sync is "make these
files match that repo, then compose up". Almost all of the design effort went
into the word "these", because getting it wrong destroys data.
A stack folder is not just the compose file. Compose creates bind-mount
directories in it — ./config, ./data — and those hold the live state of whatever
is running. So the obvious implementation, clone into the stack folder and
git reset --hard, is a data-loss bug waiting for its first `git clean`. Instead
the clone lives in a cache under ${DATA_DIR}/git/<stack> where reset and clean
are safe, and the configured subtree is copied across. No .git ends up in the
stack folder, so backups and the file browser are unaffected too.
Deletion is the other half. Making a folder "match" a repo naively means
removing what the repo does not have, which is exactly the application data
above. So each sync records the paths it wrote, and the next sync may delete
only those — a file the repository never provided cannot be touched by any code
path here. Tested directly: a database file and a hand-written .env survive a
sync that replaces the compose file and removes a file the repo dropped.
What the repo does provide is overwritten, hand edits included. That is the
point of GitOps rather than a wart, but it is a surprise if you attach a repo to
a stack you have been editing, so the connect form says it before the first sync
and the first sync is never automatic.
The webhook is the only route in StackPilot with no bearer token, because a Git
forge has none to present. It authenticates with an HMAC over the body —
X-Hub-Signature-256 for GitHub/Gitea/Forgejo, X-Gitlab-Token for GitLab, both
compared in constant time — and answers 404, not 403, to anything unsigned. A
403 would confirm that a given stack exists and is connected to a repository,
which an unauthenticated caller has not earned. The authorization matrix test
caught this route being public and made me write that reasoning down in it,
which is exactly what that test is for.
Credentials never reach a command line: ps is readable by every process on the
host, and this runs in a container next to everything else. The HTTPS token goes
to git through GIT_ASKPASS and the environment, the SSH key through a 0600 file
kept outside the working tree, and everything git prints is scrubbed of both —
plus any credential-carrying URL — before it is stored in last_error or shown.
Auto-deploy takes the same per-stack lock as every other lifecycle action, so a
webhook firing mid-deploy reports "files synced, stack busy" instead of racing a
second compose run at the same project.
The image needed git and openssh-client, which is the only reason this release
touches the Dockerfile.
26 tests against real repositories created with the real git binary, none of
them touching the network — mocking git would mostly test the mock. Verified end
to end as well: connect, sync, a push that changes one file and deletes another,
a wrongly signed webhook, a correctly signed one, and the live data still there
afterwards.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A session token is the wrong credential for automation. It expires in an hour,
it is minted by typing a password, and revoking it signs every one of that
person's devices out. So automation gets its own credential, revocable on its
own, and showing up in the audit log as itself.
Three decisions worth recording, because each one is a place this could have
been built wrong.
**Only a hash is stored.** This is the opposite call from registry passwords one
release ago, and for a concrete reason: a registry password has to be handed
back to the registry, so it must be recoverable and is encrypted. A token is
only ever compared against, so it does not need to be — and not keeping it is
the difference between leaking the database and leaking everything the database
protects. It is shown once and cannot be recovered; a readable prefix is kept so
rows are still identifiable in the UI and the audit log. The hash is SHA-256,
deliberately not bcrypt: bcrypt is slow to make guessing low-entropy human
passwords expensive, and a token is 256 bits of secrets output, so the cost
would buy nothing and would land on every single API request.
**The scope is not folded into the User object.** get_current_user returns a
session-attached row; downgrading its role in place to represent a read-only
token would be written back to the database the next time anything committed
that user — logout-everywhere does exactly that. So the token row is stashed on
request.state and require_admin consults it, leaving the User untouched. The
same lookup caps a token at its owner's authority rather than trusting the scope
alone, so a demoted admin's token drops to read-only with them and a disabled
account's tokens stop working.
**A token cannot make itself permanent.** Creating tokens and creating users now
require a signed-in session, via a require_session dependency that rejects
token-authenticated requests. Without it, a leaked CI credential could mint a
second one and survive its own revocation — the failure mode where revoking the
leak does nothing. This is the one behaviour change for existing installs:
scripted user creation now needs a login.
The WebSocket routes still take JWTs only. They carry logs, the terminal and the
deploy console, which a CI job has no use for, and leaving them alone keeps the
token surface to the REST API.
19 tests, covering what is stored, that a read token really is read-only while
its owner is an admin, that demoting and disabling the owner both take effect,
expiry, tampering, the throttle on last-used writes, and that a token can
neither mint another nor create a user. Verified end to end against a running
app: two tokens, both scopes, revocation, and no plaintext anywhere in the
database or the list response.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This was on the gap list as a missing feature, but it was a bug first. The
update checker asks the registry for a tag's digest over HTTP itself, and could
only do it anonymously. A private repository answers 401, remote_digest returned
None, and None already meant "could not reach registry" — so a private image was
indistinguishable from a network blip. The Images page showed nothing and a
stack pinned to a six-month-old image looked up to date indefinitely.
So AuthRequired is now its own exception, separate from unreachable, and the
error names the registry and which of the two problems it is: "ghcr.io needs
credentials" when there are none, "ghcr.io rejected the stored credentials" when
there are and they are wrong. Those are different fixes, and the message should
say which one you need. The plain unreachable message survives unchanged, with a
test pinning it, because not every failure is an auth failure.
Two consumers need the credentials and they need them in completely different
shapes, which is why this is its own service rather than a field on something
else. StackPilot's own checker wants (user, password) inside async code that has
no database session, so the rows are mirrored into an in-memory cache that
reload() refills on startup and after every write. The Docker CLI wants a
config.json, so reload() writes one into ${DATA_DIR}/docker and compose runs with
DOCKER_CONFIG pointed at it. Generating it from the database every time is what
makes deletion real: removing a registry in the UI revokes the CLI's login
instead of leaving a stale one in ~/.docker.
Host normalization is the join that makes any of it work, and it is easy to
underestimate. parse_ref only ever produces registry-1.docker.io, nobody types
that, and the CLI wants the whole thing under https://index.docker.io/v1/ — three
spellings of one registry across three layers. canonical_host settles on what
parse_ref produces, the config writer translates on the way out, and a bare
nginx:alpine finds credentials entered as "docker.io". Verified end to end:
typed as the v1 URL, stored as registry-1.docker.io, written as the v1 URL.
The password is encrypted at rest with the same key as backup destinations and
never leaves the server, not even masked — the API returns has_password, which
is all the form needs to offer "leave blank to keep". A row that cannot be
decrypted after a SECRET_KEY change is skipped with a warning rather than taking
every other registry down with it. Everything here is admin-only including the
reads, because even masked the rows say which registries this install talks to
and under what account.
The Test button asks the registry rather than validating a string, following the
Bearer challenge with credentials attached the way a real client does. Only an
outright 401 counts as wrong credentials; anything else means reachable and
talking, which is as much as a credentials check can honestly claim. Checked
against the live Docker Hub token endpoint with deliberately wrong credentials.
33 tests: the normalization table, the cache, the generated config.json down to
its 0600 mode and the Docker Hub key, encryption at rest, that no password field
appears in any response, and the 401-is-reported behaviour that started this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
0.51.0 gave every stack an icon, but a generic one: jellyfin got a clapperboard,
not the Jellyfin logo. Glyphs make a list readable; they do not make a stack
recognisable, which was the point. This resolves stacks against the selfh.st
icon catalog (~2900 self-hosted apps, the set Homarr and Homepage draw on), so
the row shows the thing people already recognise. All 83 bundled templates
resolve to their own logo.
The whole design question was *who* talks to the CDN. If the <img> points at
jsdelivr, then every client needs internet, every page load leaks the names of
somebody's stacks to a third party, and an air-gapped box gets nothing. So the
backend does it: the catalog on startup and weekly after, each logo once on
first use, both into ${DATA_DIR}/stack-icons/. Browsers keep reading icons from
the authenticated endpoint that already existed for uploads, and after the first
fetch the feature is fully offline. Logos are cached per *app*, not per stack —
verified: two stacks resolving to jellyfin produce one download.
Nothing here can fail loudly. Every entry point returns None rather than raising
when the network is absent, the catalog refresh is a task the lifespan does not
await, and an install with no outbound internet simply keeps 0.51.0's glyphs.
That fallback is also what covers a name the catalog does not know
("Mediaserver Wohnzimmer" is still a clapperboard), and the seconds after a
fresh install before the catalog lands. The glyph is derived even for stacks
that *do* have a logo, so an image that cannot be fetched degrades to something
meaningful instead of a box.
Matching gained a second source that turned out to matter more than expected:
the compose images. A stack called "medienserver" says nothing, but it pulls
lscr.io/linuxserver/jellyfin — strip the registry, the vendor and the tag and
the app is right there. Name first, then the longest run of words inside it,
then the images. It is deliberately cautious: a single word shorter than four
characters never claims a logo, because "web", "app" and "db" are all catalog
entries and a *wrong* logo is worse than a neutral glyph. A short alias table
covers what the catalog spells differently from Docker Hub (postgres →
postgresql, pihole → pi-hole, wg-easy → wireguard).
A slug arrives from the database and from query strings and then becomes a
filename, so it is pattern-checked before it is ever joined to a path, catalog
entries that are not slug-shaped are dropped on load, and a downloaded logo is
verified to start with the PNG magic bytes before being cached.
The picker searches the catalog too — pre-seeded with the stack's own name, so
opening it on "jellyfin" offers the Jellyfin logo first — which is how a wrong
match gets corrected, and how a stack can be given any app's logo on purpose.
Verified end to end against the live catalog and real downloads: list rows carry
the resolved logo, the icon endpoint serves real PNG bytes, an unmatched stack
404s (and falls through to its glyph), a hand-picked logo round-trips, reset
clears it, and a traversal slug 404s. 30 new backend tests and 12 new frontend
ones run without any network at all.
0.52.0 rather than amending 0.51.0: those images are already in the registry,
and rebuilding a published version tag with different content is exactly what
breaks the self-update checker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stacks were a name and a coloured dot. The dot carried the status but nothing
carried identity, so a list of twenty stacks read as twenty identical rows.
This gives each one an icon in front of its name and moves the status onto that
icon as a halo in the status colour, which is the thing the eye lands on anyway.
The constraint that shaped the design: people already have stacks. Asking them
to pick an icon for each one before the feature does anything would mean it
never gets used, so the icon is *derived* from the stack's name and the column
stays empty until somebody overrides it. ~700 keywords in 79 groups cover the
self-hosted long tail (jellyfin -> clapperboard, vaultwarden -> key,
home-assistant -> house) plus generic English and German terms; the longest
match wins, so photoprism beats a bare photo, and short keywords like "tv" only
match as whole words. No backfill, no migration, and a rename moves the icon
with it.
That is also why the catalog and the matcher live in the frontend. It is the
only place that can render an icon, so a copy in the backend would be a list to
keep in sync and nothing else. The server validates the shape of the stored
value and stores uploads; it never needs to know what "lucide:database" looks
like. An icon name that later leaves the catalog falls back to the derived one
rather than blanking the row.
Overriding happens in two places, because there are two moments: the editor
(holding a chosen file until the stack exists, since uploading needs an id) and
a click on the icon on the detail page, which is how a stack that has existed
for a year gets one without a trip through the editor.
Uploads are classified by their bytes, not by the filename or Content-Type the
browser claims, and land in ${DATA_DIR}/stack-icons/ under the stack id. SVG is
allowed — <img> does not execute it — but the endpoint serves every icon as an
attachment so one can never be opened as a document in the API's own origin. A
client-supplied "custom:" value is refused: the server mints those, so a stack
cannot be pointed at a file it does not own. Files follow the stack: replaced on
re-upload (including across formats, or the old one orphans), copied on clone,
removed on delete.
The one piece of plumbing worth knowing about: the icon endpoint needs the
bearer token like everything else, and an <img src> would not carry it. So
StackIcon fetches the bytes through the API client and renders the blob, keyed
on the stored value — which carries an upload timestamp precisely so a re-upload
changes the key and retires the cached image.
Covered by 22 backend tests (the value rules, byte-sniffing, the file lifecycle,
the API round-trip, and that the read-only role cannot change an icon) and 29
frontend ones for the matcher. The schema change was verified against a
hand-built pre-0.51 database: the column is added on start and existing rows
come back NULL, i.e. automatic. Not click-tested in a browser — no Docker in
this environment — so the row height the taller icon produces is unverified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
StackPilot now manages exactly one Docker host: the one it runs on. The
stackpilot-agent sidecar and everything that proxied to it are gone — 4721
lines deleted against 657 added.
Deleted outright: agent/ (image, compose, env), agent_app.py, models/agent.py,
routers/agents.py (1200 lines), services/agent_service.py, the agent API client,
RemoteStackDetail, the host components and AgentStacksSection. That removes 57
API routes and the three /ws/agent-* proxies.
Threaded out everywhere else, which was the bulk of the work. Every API module
carried an optional agentId that switched the base path; every page that listed
Docker objects rendered one section per host behind a HostHeader; Files had a
host switcher; the New Stack editor and the template dialog had host selectors;
schedules, auto-update policies and stack summaries carried agent_id. All of it
is gone, and the typechecker drove the sweep — 85 files touched, tsc and the
build clean.
Two things the removal exposed as dead weight rather than merely unused:
compose_service kept an in-process busy set purely because the agent needed a
lock and has no database. With the agent gone that was a second source of truth
next to the real DB lock, so it is deleted; compute_status now reports only what
the containers say and the two callers that want "updating" overlay the lock.
StacksTable's linkBase prop only ever existed to point at /hosts/{id}/stacks.
The dashboard's "Hosts 1/1 online" KPI can no longer say anything else, so the
tile and the KPIs behind it are gone and the row is five wide.
Upgrading matters here. An existing install still has an agent table holding
each remote host's URL and bearer token — full Docker control of that host,
sitting in the database with nothing left to use it. _drop_removed_schema drops
it on first start, and drops the agent_id columns where the SQLite build
supports DROP COLUMN. Each statement runs in its own transaction on purpose: a
failed DDL poisons the transaction it is in, so sharing one would let an
unsupported column drop take the table drop down with it. test_agent_removal
covers both branches plus the fresh-install and idempotent cases, and an
end-to-end run against a seeded pre-0.48 database confirms the table is gone and
every /api/agents route answers 404.
Docstrings that justified a design by "shared with the agent, which has no
database" were rewritten rather than left lying: update_service's persistence
callback and image_status_store are still the right split (registry logic stays
testable without a database), but for that reason now, not the old one. The
README's multi-host sections are removed and an upgrade note explains what to do
with running agent containers; ROADMAP keeps its history behind a note saying
the feature it describes no longer exists.
CI no longer builds or pushes stackpilot-agent.
735 tests pass, ruff and tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
F7 — Nothing stopped two compose operations landing on the same stack. There
was a busy flag, but is_busy() was only ever read to colour the status column;
no lifecycle handler consulted it before acting. Two tabs, or auto-update
picking up a stack somebody had just clicked, both ran pull + up -d against the
same project and raced over recreating containers.
Lifecycle calls, the two deploy WebSockets and the auto-update pass now take a
real lock; a second caller gets 409 (or an error frame and close 4409) and
auto-update skips and retries next cycle. The lock is a row rather than a set
in one worker's memory, so it holds across workers and across a restart, and it
carries an expiry — a worker killed mid-deploy would otherwise strand the stack
with no fix short of editing the database.
F10 — /api/stacks/stats sampled every running container on every call, one
blocking daemon request each, and both the dashboard and the stacks list poll
it every five seconds. Two tabs on a 40-container host meant a sustained ~16
samples a second. Cached for 4s behind a lock so concurrent callers share one
sweep, the same shape dashboard_service already used for its fleet aggregate.
F11 — Three module dicts assumed exactly one uvicorn worker without saying so
and were lost on restart. The busy set is the lock above. The image update
cache is now mirrored to SQLite, so a restart shows the badges immediately
instead of blanking them for up to an hour, and the already-notified marks come
back with them rather than re-announcing the same updates. The login rate
limiter is a table, so it cannot be cleared by getting the process to restart
and no longer multiplies by the worker count.
The constraint that shaped this: compose_service and update_service are shared
with the agent, which has no database. Neither may import one. So the lock is a
separate service the central app enforces at its own entry points, and update
persistence is an opt-in callback the central app registers in its lifespan —
the agent registers nothing and behaves exactly as before. A test asserts
update_service never imports the database, since that is the kind of thing a
later change breaks silently.
Both new nets were checked by reverting the fix: dropping the lock from
_lifecycle fails six tests, removing the stats cache fails the one that names
the behaviour.
Also wires up cache pruning in the same sweep — without it both the dict and
the table grew one entry per image tag ever run, for the life of the install.
31 new tests (729 total).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
The repo had no tests, no lint config, and a CI that went straight from push
to docker push. That is the reason F1 could ship: authorization lives in the
routers, each of 171 routes independently picks require_admin or
get_current_user, and nothing checked the choice was right.
670 tests, no Docker daemon needed. The app is driven through TestClient
without entering it as a context manager, which skips the lifespan — no
background loops, no socket — and conftest points DATA_DIR/STACKS_DIR at a
temp directory before anything is imported.
test_route_authorization.py is the load-bearing one. Rather than 171 implied
decisions it states the policy once — every route requires admin unless it is
listed in USER_READABLE or PUBLIC — and fails on any route that disagrees. A
new route defaults to admin, which is the safe direction; what it catches is a
route written with get_current_user that nobody weighed against "can this
return a credential". Writing the allowlist meant auditing all 53 user-readable
routes, which turned up one more leak: GET /api/templates/{id} returns a
template's env, and "save stack as template" snapshots the stack's real .env
into it. Now admin-only; the listing stays open.
test_agent_authorization.py pins the same invariant on the agent, where the
whole access model is one shared token declared per route and a single
forgotten Depends(verify_token) would hand over the host.
Both were checked by reintroducing the bug: re-opening /api/files/read fails
three tests with actionable messages, dropping a token guard fails two.
test_bundled_templates.py covers the 83 templates — parse, image per service,
.env.example in sync with what compose reads, every bind-mounted file actually
shipped, and no working default password. It found one on its first run:
authentik shipped PG_PASS=change-me and AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY=change-me against
a compose that marks both required, so the stack would have come up with a
known password instead of refusing to start. Fixed.
The rest ports the ad-hoc harnesses from 0.44.0 into permanent tests (crypto
round-trip incl. plaintext passthrough and key-loss handling, the browse
sandbox) and covers compose_service's slug/status/file handling and
secret_service's name validation.
ruff is configured as a floor, not a style bar: F, E9 and B only. Import
sorting is deliberately out — it is style, and enabling it would rewrite the
imports of nine files that have nothing else wrong. The 12 findings it did have
are fixed here (unused imports, an unused local, four raise-without-from that
were swallowing exception context).
CI now runs check (ruff, pytest, tsc) and only builds if it passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
F1 — Any authenticated user could read any file the backend could see.
/api/files/read and /download hung on get_current_user, and the sandbox that
should have caught that was open by default: ALLOWED_BROWSE_ROOTS contained
"/", for which _is_allowed() waves through every path. So the `user` role could
download stackpilot.db (password hashes, agent tokens, backup credentials),
every stack's .env and every .secrets/* file — with no audit trail, because
only mutations were logged.
Implementing that turned up three more doors into the same room, all fixed
here since closing only the first would have made the fix cosmetic:
GET /api/stacks/{id} handed the .env to any user, /export tarred the whole
stack dir including .secrets/*, and both the agent file proxies and
/api/agents/{id}/stacks/{id} repeated the leak for every remote host. All 24
filesystem-touching routes are now admin-only; reads and downloads are audited
(listing is not — the Files page polls it). DATA_DIR is refused outright, since
the API deliberately masks agent tokens and destination secrets and the browser
would otherwise be the way around that. "/" is out of the default browse roots.
F2 — Backup destination credentials were plaintext JSON in the DB, which is
what made F1 worth exploiting. They are now Fernet-encrypted at rest behind
parse_config/dump_config, with existing rows migrated at startup.
This needed a prerequisite from F6: the key is derived from SECRET_KEY, which
was regenerated on every boot when unset. Encrypting against a key that changes
per restart would be worse than plaintext, so an auto-generated SECRET_KEY is
now persisted to ${DATA_DIR}/secret_key at mode 0600. Sessions surviving a
restart is a welcome side effect.
F3 — /api/audit is admin-only. Also hidden from the dashboard and the nav for
non-admins, so nobody polls into a 403.
F4 — uvicorn now runs with --proxy-headers, so nginx's X-Forwarded-For is
honoured. Without it request.client.host was the frontend container's IP for
every request, which made the login rate limit global instead of per-IP (10
failures locked out everyone) and filled the audit log's IP column with one
useless value.
Verified: encrypt/decrypt round-trip incl. plaintext passthrough, idempotent
re-encryption and wrong-key handling; sandbox denial for DATA_DIR, traversal
into it, and paths outside the roots, with the allowed roots still reachable.
Both against stubbed settings — there is no Docker here, so nothing was run
end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
Update ran as a blocking POST with nothing to show but a spinner, so the
status added in 86c67df could only sit above the table as a banner.
Adds /ws/update/{stack_id}, streaming `compose pull` then `up -d` with
--progress json, and feeds it through the existing DeployTracker — the
same weighting the deploy console uses. The result renders as a progress
bar inside the stack's own row: percentage, phase label, and layer/byte
detail. Non-streaming actions (start/stop/restart/pull/down) reuse the
bar in its indeterminate form, so every row action looks consistent.
compose_service gains _stream_phase, shared by stream_up and the new
stream_update; a failed pull short-circuits before `up`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016pMmFFkdfxkoYjcEcpZTa5
Uploading a backup extracted the tar straight into the NFS mount via
put_archive, and the daemon chowns every entry while extracting — an export
with root_squash refuses that ("failed to Lchown ... for UID 0, GID 0:
operation not permitted"), so the upload died with a docker 500 even though
plain writes to the share work (which is why the destination test passed).
The helper container now unpacks into its own filesystem and copies the file
into the mount with cat, which never chowns. Restores hit the same wall when a
volume or bind folder lives on a squashed mount, so import_path/import_volume
fall back to a copy-through-staging when (and only when) the failure is a chown
denial — local restores keep preserving ownership. NFS file names are validated
against the same safe charset as the subdir parts, since both are interpolated
into the helper's shell commands.
Verified against a real root_squash NFS export: test/upload/list/download/delete
round trip, byte-identical download, restore into an NFS-backed volume via the
fallback, and ownership still preserved (1000:1000, 0600) on a local volume.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
_ensure_helper_image moved to stack_assets_service, but backup_destination_service
imports it lazily inside _nfs_run/_nfs_helper, so nothing failed at import time —
every NFS destination operation raised ImportError at runtime instead. The helper
is now a public ensure_helper_image() and the NFS helpers import it from its new
home. Verified: every services/ and routers/ module imports, and both NFS helper
paths run through to a Docker call instead of ImportError.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A stack's real state lives in its bind-mounted config directories, and those
were never captured: the backup only tarred the stack folder as this container
sees it. When STACKS_HOST_DIR differs from the container's STACKS_DIR, compose
resolves ./config against the container path and the daemon creates it at that
path on the *host* — invisible here, so the archive held little more than
compose.yaml and .env.
New services/stack_assets_service.py inventories a stack's data (bind sources
merged from container mounts + the compose file, named volumes) and does all
data I/O through a throwaway helper container, i.e. by host path, so unseen
directories are captured anyway. It also detects the host/container stacks-path
mismatch and reports it.
- manifest v2: full inventory, per-asset capture result, skip reasons (v1 still
restores)
- NFS/CIFS-backed volumes are skipped by default and never wiped on restore
- deselected data inside the stack folder no longer sneaks in via compose/
- volume/bind archives stream through temp files instead of RAM
- restore preserves mode, ownership, mtime and symlinks, and writes bind folders
back to their host paths (rewritten when the stack is renamed)
- backup dialog shows the inventory with sizes and per-item checkboxes; restore
gained a "restore bind folders" toggle
- new GET /api/stacks/{id}/backup/inventory (+ agent + proxy), backup endpoints
take include_binds/binds/volumes, restore takes restore_binds
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Compose is now run with `--progress json` (probed once, falls back to the
plain text stream on older compose/agents). The console folds the event
stream into a weighted progress bar — download bytes per layer, then
container create/start — with a per-image bar and a byte/layer counter,
and renders the raw output one line per layer (updated in place) instead
of a wall of scrolling text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The amber image-update indicator is fed from update_service._CACHE, which
only the background loop refreshed — after a per-stack Update/Pull the
stale digests kept the pill on until the next pass. Now the local digests
are reconciled with the cached remote digests right after a successful
pull/update (local backend, agent lifecycle, auto-update pass), and the
frontend invalidates the stack-updates queries after actions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the analytics-style dashboard (stack-health funnel, uptime %,
operations/day grid, AI pill) with an attention-driven fleet cockpit:
- New /api/dashboard/fleet endpoint: server-side fan-out across the local
host and every agent into one payload — a prioritized "needs attention"
list, headline KPIs, an honest stack-status breakdown and a per-host
resource rollup. Each agent uses its own DB session so the fan-out is
concurrency-safe; failures degrade to "offline" instead of stalling.
- New frontend: AttentionStrip, FleetKpiRow, StackStatusBar and
HostResourceTable; Dashboard.tsx rewritten around them.
- Remove the funnel/summary endpoints, the uptime sampler loop and the
ops-activity machinery; delete the now-unused chart components.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A big folder hit a 504 Gateway Timeout: the zip was built into a temp
file *before* any response was sent, so for large folders the backend
stayed silent past nginx's proxy_read_timeout.
Now the zip is streamed as it's built, end to end:
- file_service.open_archive() returns (filename, byte iterator); _iter_zip
walks the dir and yields zip bytes incrementally via a small drain
buffer, writing each file in 1 MiB chunks (bounded memory, valid CRCs).
Same hardening as before — only real regular files; FIFOs/sockets/
devices/symlinks skipped without open(); per-file read errors skipped.
- /api/files/download and /agent/files/download return a StreamingResponse
(no temp file). The agent proxy streams the agent response straight
through (agent_service.stream_download), pulling the first chunk eagerly
so an offline/bad-token agent still yields a clean status before 200.
- Files page: streamed downloads have no Content-Length, so the progress
bar shows the running downloaded byte count ("Downloading … 12.3 MB")
instead of a percentage, after the initial "Preparing …".
Verified end to end via TestClient (200, application/zip, valid zip,
2 MiB file intact, FIFO skipped, no hang).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two issues with the 0.37.0 folder zip-download:
1. Hang / server error (reported as 501) on "some folders". archive_dir
tried to zip every entry, including non-regular files. Opening a FIFO
blocks forever (no writer); a unix socket / unreadable file raised an
OSError that aborted the whole archive. Now only real regular files are
zipped — FIFOs, sockets, devices and symlinks are skipped without ever
open()-ing them, and a per-file read error skips just that file instead
of failing the download.
2. No feedback while a large folder is being prepared. The zip is built
server-side before any bytes flow, so the click felt dead. The Files
page now shows an indeterminate "Preparing <name>…" bar from click,
switching to a real percentage during the transfer (Content-Length is
known for the finished zip). filesApi.download forwards onDownloadProgress.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The file browser/editor could only download individual files. Add a
recursive directory download that streams the folder as a zip archive,
on the local host and on every remote agent.
- file_service.archive_dir(): zip a directory recursively into a temp
file, preserving the folder name as the archive root and empty
subdirectories; symlinks are skipped (no sandbox escape / loops).
- /api/files/download and /agent/files/download branch on directories
and return application/zip, cleaning up the temp file afterwards.
- Files page: show the download button for folders too (as <name>.zip).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shows an amber "Update" pill next to a stack's status (and highlights the
inline Update button) when any of the stack's images has a newer digest in
the registry. Reuses the existing background image-update check — a new
update_service.stacks_update_summary() reads the cached digests in a single
container sweep (no extra registry calls), exposed as GET /api/stacks/updates
and proxied per agent at GET /api/agents/{id}/stacks/updates. The Stacks page
and each remote-host section poll it every 60s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New destination type 'nfs' alongside SFTP and S3. The StackPilot container
needs no mount privileges: the Docker daemon mounts the export as a named
volume (stackpilot-nfs-dest-<id>, driver local/type nfs, recreated whenever
server/path/options change) and all file I/O runs through throwaway helper
containers (BACKUP_HELPER_IMAGE) — upload via put_archive, list via stat,
download via get_archive, delete/test via short-lived runs. Config: server,
export path, mount options (default rw), optional subdirectory (sanitized;
shell-safe charset). Mount failures surface as clean destination errors.
Settings UI gains the NFS form + summary; works everywhere destinations are
used (push, restore-from, scheduled backups incl. retention).
Verified live against a real kernel NFS server: test, push (file on the
export), list, restore-from incl. volume data, remote delete, config change
recreates the mount volume, unreachable server fails cleanly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- backup_filename() crashed with NameError (bare now()) since 0.8.0 —
broke every scheduled backup at the upload step, agent backup download
and the central remote-backup/push endpoints. The local manual path
worked only because the router had its own copy (now an alias).
- restore: the manifest stack_id from an uploaded backup is now slugified
too — a crafted '../../...' id could previously escape STACKS_DIR.
- create_backup no longer starts a previously-stopped stack (stop/restart
only when the stack was actually running).
- overwrite-restore wipes the existing volume contents before extracting,
so files created since the backup no longer survive underneath it.
Verified end-to-end: full/config backup contents (compose, .env, .secrets,
bind dirs, extras, volume tars), delete→restore round-trip incl. volume
data, rename restore with volume re-prefixing, 409 conflict + overwrite,
traversal guard, scheduled run + retention prune + restore-from against
real MinIO, and the complete remote-agent cycle (download/push/restore).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- backend/version.py is now the single version source (main.py, agent).
- GET /api/system/update: reads the version tags of the backend's own image
repo (anonymous v2 token flow, https→http fallback for insecure
registries), compares the highest semver tag against APP_VERSION; reports
update_supported from the container's compose labels. 10 min cache.
- POST /api/system/update (admin, audited): spawns a detached helper
container from the current backend image that runs docker compose pull &&
up -d on StackPilot's own compose project (project name, working dir and
config files resolved from its own container labels) — the helper
outlives the backend being recreated. Non-compose installs get a 400.
- /api/health now returns the version so the UI can detect the switchover.
- TopNav version badge: queries the update status on page load; when a
newer release exists an amber pill shows the version — one click (admin)
confirms, triggers the update and overlays a wait screen that polls
/api/health and reloads once the new version answers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Container card now compares compose-only counts across hosts: agents
report compose_running in /agent/system (pre-0.31.1 agents fall back to
the all-containers number); card retitled, ResourceBar stat labelled
'Containers (all)'.
- Uptime is sampled every 5 min (background loop + opportunistic on read)
and charted as daily averages instead of a once-a-day snapshot; no
sample is written when no compose containers exist (was: fake 100%).
Legacy daily entries in uptime.jsonl still count; file pruned at startup.
- Funnel stage 'monitored' is now per-stack and real: stacks with an
enabled local auto-update policy (was: global webhook-exists toggle).
Frontend label renamed to 'Auto-managed'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Templates are now stack-shaped folders (compose.yaml + .env.example +
template.json) instead of DB rows + manifest.json + {{VAR}} rendering.
Pull copies the folder into a new stack; custom templates persist under
DATA_DIR/templates. Adds POST /api/templates/from-stack and a one-time
startup migration for pre-0.31 DB templates (drops the template table).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Manage Docker secrets and configs per stack from a new Secrets tab on Stack/
RemoteStackDetail. Content is stored as files inside the stack dir
(.secrets/<name>, .configs/<name>; dir 0700 / file 0600) and referenced from the
compose file with relative `file:` paths, so the daemon reads them without any
HOST_ROOT_PREFIX dependency. Content is write-only — the API only ever returns
metadata (name, kind, size).
- secret_service: write/delete/list (metadata only)/exists/rel_path/attach/detach;
name validation rejects traversal/hidden/separators, content capped at 1 MiB.
- compose_edit_service: add/remove secret and config (top-level defs pruned when
no service still references them).
- routers/secrets.py (admin-only, audit secret.*) + agent endpoints + multi-host
proxy (audit agent.secret.*).
- Frontend SecretsPanel (create/list/delete + per-row attach/detach to a service;
config rows take a mount target), agentId-aware for remote stacks.
Verified: name-sandbox + perms + metadata-only listing unit-tested; compose
add/remove round-trips to clean YAML; py_compile + backend/agent/frontend image
builds + route smoke-test (local/agent/proxy). Live exec check (/run/secrets/<name>
on a deployed stack) and swarm path are hardware-verify debt (swarm dropped: A).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-stack auto-update policy on the stack Overview tab. When the background
image-update check finds a newer registry digest for one of a stack's images,
the stack is pulled + redeployed (or just flagged, "notify only"). Only running
stacks are auto-redeployed; a stopped stack is skipped, never silently started.
- models/auto_update.py: AutoUpdate(stack_id, agent_id, enabled, redeploy,
last_run/status/result) + schemas; registered in models/__init__.py.
- update_service: DB-free stack_images/stack_updates helpers (agent reuses
them); agent GET /agent/stacks/{id}/updates.
- services/auto_update_service.py: run_due/run_policy (local pull+up via
compose_service, remote via agent_service POST /agent/stacks/{id}/update,
notify-only with per-transition dedup); lazy-called from
update_service.background_loop. New stack_auto_updated notify event.
- routers: GET/PUT/run /api/stacks/{id}/auto-update and the
/api/agents/{id}/stacks/{sid}/auto-update variants (policy stored centrally).
- frontend: api/autoUpdate.ts + AutoUpdatePanel (enable, redeploy|notify-only,
Check now, last-run status) on StackDetail + RemoteStackDetail; EVENT_LABELS
gains stack_auto_updated + backup_failed.
Live-verified all four paths (updated / update-available / up-to-date /
skipped) against real compose.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Interactive shell into a compose-managed container over WebSocket + xterm.js,
opened from the container card on the stack Overview tab. Admin-only (non-admin
handshake rejected with 4403); only containers with the compose project label
are reachable.
- backend services/exec_service.py: create/start/resize exec + a shared
bidirectional pump_exec (recv/sendall on sock._sock, executor thread,
resize control frames, exit-code frame).
- routers/ws.py: _authorize_admin + /ws/exec/{container_id} and the
/ws/agent-exec/{agent_id}/{container_id} proxy (forwards BOTH directions).
- agent_app.py: /agent/ws/exec/{container_id}.
- frontend: @xterm/xterm + @xterm/addon-fit; ContainerTerminal modal (shell
picker, fit/resize, exit/error handling) + a Terminal button on ContainerCard.
Live-verified (TestClient): local happy/exit/guard/4403/4401, agent happy/4401,
proxy bidirectional round-trip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stack Overview now renders each service as an expandable ContainerCard with a
curated single-container inspect view and admin start/stop/restart buttons,
both for local stacks (GET/POST /api/containers/{id}[/{action}]) and remote
stacks (proxied via /api/agents/{id}/containers/* to the agent's new
/agent/containers/* endpoints). Only compose-managed containers are exposed.
Also bumps version 0.23.0 -> 0.26.0 (the bumps for the already-committed
Phase 18 image-prune / Phase 19 compose-validate were missed) and backfills
README sections for Phase 18/19/20.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deploying a local stack from the editor now opens a console modal that streams
the `docker compose up -d` output (image pulls, container creation) live over a
new `/ws/deploy/{stack_id}` WebSocket, replacing the blind "Deploying…" spinner.
The compose subprocess keeps running server-side if the modal is closed early;
the same audit entry + start/error notification as the REST start path is recorded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stacks overview and detail were doing an N+1 inspect storm: list_stacks
called containers_for_stack AND compute_status (which re-fetched) per
stack, and containers.list(sparse=False) full-inspects every container
plus c.image triggered an image-inspect each. For N stacks that was
~2N*(1 list + M inspects + M image-inspects) sequential socket round
trips (~1s for just 2 stacks, growing linearly).
- compose_service.stack_status_summaries(): one low-level
api.containers(all=True) summary call grouped by compose project label
→ whole list served in a single Docker round-trip (~10x faster).
- compute_status() takes optional pre-fetched containers; get_stack and
_stack_summary no longer double-fetch.
- containers_for_stack() reads the image name from the inspect it already
has instead of c.image (drops the per-container image-inspect).
- Same batching applied to the agent's stack list/detail.
Also: Forgejo (registry + git) moved to 10.10.6.10:3020 — updated image
refs in docker-compose.yml, agent/Dockerfile, agent/docker-compose.yml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Port-conflict check now matches the stack's own containers via the
compose project label instead of a fragile container-name prefix, so
editing + deploying a running stack no longer reports false conflicts
(explicit container_name or '_' name separator).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Docker's volume list has no size, so add a "Compute sizes" button that runs
`docker system df` (via client.df()) and shows per-volume size in a new Size
column. The df walk is expensive (seconds), so results are cached ~60s and
loaded on demand instead of on every poll.
- volume_service.volume_sizes(force) with a 60s TTL cache; GET /api/volumes/sizes
+ agent /agent/volumes/sizes + proxy /api/agents/{id}/volumes/sizes.
- Frontend: volumesApi.sizes(force, agentId); Volumes page gained a Size column
and a Compute sizes button (per host) that triggers the lookup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dashboard now lists stacks in a table with live CPU and memory usage per
stack. Usage is sampled from docker stats (one-shot read per running container,
using the daemon-provided precpu for the CPU delta) and aggregated by compose
project.
- services/stats_service.py + GET /api/stacks/stats: per-stack cpu_used (cores),
mem_used (bytes minus reclaimable cache), and the summed assigned cpu/mem
limits (null when none set), read concurrently across containers.
- Dashboard: stacks render as a table with a CPU and a Memory meter. When a
limit is assigned the bar fills toward it (used / limit + %); otherwise it
fills toward the host total. Inline start/stop/restart per row for admins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Networks and Images are now per-host, rendered as a section for the local host
plus one per registered agent (like the Stacks page).
- agent_app.py: new /agent/networks (list/inspect/containers/connect/disconnect/
create/delete/prune) and /agent/images (list/updates/check), reusing
network_service and a new image_service; DockerError mapped to HTTP status
(forbidden -> 400 so the proxy doesn't treat it as a token failure).
- routers/agents.py: proxy routes at /api/agents/{id}/networks/* and
/api/agents/{id}/images/*, audit-logging mutations.
- services/image_service.py: extracted the image-listing logic so the central
router and the agent share it.
- Frontend: networksApi/imagesApi take an optional agentId; Networks/Images
pages render NetworksSection/ImagesSection per host with a shared HostHeader.
Remote "Prune unused" networks resolves the address-pool-exhaustion deploy
error from the UI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Folder upload: the Files page gained an "Upload folder" picker
(webkitdirectory); each file is sent with its webkitRelativePath and the
backend recreates the directory tree. upload_target now accepts an optional
rel_path, creating intermediate dirs (mkdir -p) inside the sandbox with each
component validated against traversal.
Copy/move: new file_service.copy/move + POST /api/files/{copy,move}
(admin, audit-logged). The UI adds per-row copy/cut actions, a clipboard bar
to paste into the current directory, and an overwrite prompt on conflict.
Both refuse to move/copy a folder into itself or its own subtree and are
sandbox-checked on source and destination.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a full host filesystem browser reachable from the sidebar (/files):
breadcrumb navigation, browse-root chips, show-hidden toggle, and a table
with size/permissions/mtime. Text files open in a Monaco editor (language by
extension); binary/oversized files fall back to download. Admins can create
folders/files, rename, delete (recursive for dirs), upload, and save edits;
download is available to all users. Every mutation is audit-logged.
Backend: new services/file_service.py reuses device_service's sandbox helpers
(confined to ALLOWED_BROWSE_ROOTS, mapped via HOST_ROOT_PREFIX) and rejects
path traversal and deleting a browse root. routers/files.py exposes
/api/files/{list,read,download,write,mkdir,touch,rename,upload,DELETE}
(reads: any user; mutations: admin). device_service.browse entries gained
mtime + symlink (non-breaking).
Deployment: ALLOWED_BROWSE_ROOTS + HOST_ROOT_PREFIX are now env-wired in
docker-compose.yml and .env.example, with a commented /:/host_root mount to
browse/manage the real host filesystem.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Live remote-stack logs over a WebSocket proxied through the central app to
the agent (/ws/agent-logs/{agent}/{stack}); agent gains a WS log endpoint.
- Deploy to a remote host from the UI: host selector in the New Stack editor
and template dialog; templates instantiate onto an agent via the proxy.
- Network attach/detach: expandable inspect view per network with
connect/disconnect + container picker; GET /{id}/containers, POST connect/disconnect.
- Remove dead pages/Placeholder.tsx.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- gpu_service: detect host render/video group GIDs from /dev/dri node ownership
(render node → render GID, paired card node → video GID); added to GPUInfo +
exposed via /api/system/gpus. inject_dri now emits numeric group_add entries
(e.g. ["991","44"]) when GIDs are known, falling back to names otherwise;
remove_gpu strips those GIDs + LIBVA_DRIVER_NAME; dri_group_gids() for cleanup.
- editor set-gpu passes render_gid/video_gid through; GPUSelector shows detected
GIDs, defaults video group on, and sends them.
Verified: py_compile, unit check (inject→["991","44"] then clean removal),
frontend tsc build, image imports. Live iGPU verify is on the user's hardware.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Networks: network_service (list w/ subnet/containers/in-use/owning-stack,
create bridge/macvlan/ipvlan/overlay + optional subnet/gateway/internal,
delete with default-network guard, prune) + routers/networks.py; real
Networks page replaces the placeholder.
- Fix: local stacks can now be deleted from the UI — Delete button on stack
detail (with optional keep-files-on-disk) and a trash action on stack cards,
via a shared ConfirmDialog. (Backend DELETE existed; no UI surfaced it.)
Verified: py_compile, frontend tsc build, live network list smoke test
(defaults flagged, compose nets + in-use detected); main 104 routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- BackupSchedule model + schedule_service: next-run calc (hourly/daily/weekly,
UTC), background scheduler loop (lifespan), run-one with retention pruning
(keep newest N per stack on the destination), backup_failed notify event.
- routers/schedules.py: schedules CRUD + run-now; registered in main.py.
- Frontend: api/schedules.ts + Settings → Scheduled backups (list with next/last
run + status, enable/disable, run-now, delete; add form with stack/destination/
frequency/time/weekday/retention/volumes).
Rough-verified only (per request): py_compile, frontend tsc build, app import
(95 routes), next-run math sanity. Full live run to be tested after deploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- BackupDestination model + backup_destination_service (SFTP via paramiko,
S3-compatible via boto3): upload/list/download/delete/test.
- routers/destinations.py: destinations CRUD (secrets masked, merge-on-update),
test, list/delete remote backups. backups.py: POST /{id}/backup/push and
POST /restore-from (download from a destination + restore, volumes included).
- Frontend: Settings → Backup destinations (SFTP/S3 forms + test); Backup dialog
can push to a destination; Restore dialog can pick a destination + backup.
- deps: paramiko 3.5.0, boto3 1.35.99.
Verified end-to-end against live MinIO + atmoz/sftp: create/test destinations,
push (incl. volumes), list, restore-from to a fresh stack (volume data intact),
delete remote backup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
