The volume prune gets the same treatment as the image prune in 0.61.0:
the candidates are listed and removed one by one in the background, and
the Volumes page shows a progress bar (x / y, the volume being removed,
failures) followed by a toast with the space freed.
The button also used to delete without asking, and a bare docker volume
prune only removes anonymous volumes on Engine 23+ with no way to include
named ones. It now opens a confirmation dialog with an explicit -a option
that warns it also takes the data of every stack that is down.
- Candidates: volumes no container (running or stopped) mounts, local
scope only, and anonymous (com.docker.volume.anonymous) unless -a.
Volumes from pre-23 daemons carry no such label, so they only go with
-a, which errs on the side of keeping data.
- Removed without force, so a volume mounted since the listing is
refused; one refusal does not stop the rest.
- No closing daemon prune: nothing is left over, and on a pre-23 daemon an
unfiltered one would delete named volumes too.
- Freed space is the sum of the deleted volumes' sizes (volumes share no
data), from the size cache, which is invalidated afterwards.
- POST /api/volumes/prune takes all= and background=; without background
it still waits and returns {VolumesDeleted, SpaceReclaimed}.
GET /api/volumes/prune-status is admin-only.
- volume_sizes() ("Compute sizes") now uses the long-timeout client; it
walks every volume and could hit the same 60s limit.
The progress machinery moved into services/prune_job.py (PruneJob,
PrunePlan) and, on the frontend, the usePruneJob hook and PruneProgress
component, shared by both pages. The status now carries a phase
(preparing / removing / finishing) so the parts without a count say what
they are doing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F1 — Any authenticated user could read any file the backend could see.
/api/files/read and /download hung on get_current_user, and the sandbox that
should have caught that was open by default: ALLOWED_BROWSE_ROOTS contained
"/", for which _is_allowed() waves through every path. So the `user` role could
download stackpilot.db (password hashes, agent tokens, backup credentials),
every stack's .env and every .secrets/* file — with no audit trail, because
only mutations were logged.
Implementing that turned up three more doors into the same room, all fixed
here since closing only the first would have made the fix cosmetic:
GET /api/stacks/{id} handed the .env to any user, /export tarred the whole
stack dir including .secrets/*, and both the agent file proxies and
/api/agents/{id}/stacks/{id} repeated the leak for every remote host. All 24
filesystem-touching routes are now admin-only; reads and downloads are audited
(listing is not — the Files page polls it). DATA_DIR is refused outright, since
the API deliberately masks agent tokens and destination secrets and the browser
would otherwise be the way around that. "/" is out of the default browse roots.
F2 — Backup destination credentials were plaintext JSON in the DB, which is
what made F1 worth exploiting. They are now Fernet-encrypted at rest behind
parse_config/dump_config, with existing rows migrated at startup.
This needed a prerequisite from F6: the key is derived from SECRET_KEY, which
was regenerated on every boot when unset. Encrypting against a key that changes
per restart would be worse than plaintext, so an auto-generated SECRET_KEY is
now persisted to ${DATA_DIR}/secret_key at mode 0600. Sessions surviving a
restart is a welcome side effect.
F3 — /api/audit is admin-only. Also hidden from the dashboard and the nav for
non-admins, so nobody polls into a 403.
F4 — uvicorn now runs with --proxy-headers, so nginx's X-Forwarded-For is
honoured. Without it request.client.host was the frontend container's IP for
every request, which made the login rate limit global instead of per-IP (10
failures locked out everyone) and filled the audit log's IP column with one
useless value.
Verified: encrypt/decrypt round-trip incl. plaintext passthrough, idempotent
re-encryption and wrong-key handling; sandbox denial for DATA_DIR, traversal
into it, and paths outside the roots, with the allowed roots still reachable.
Both against stubbed settings — there is no Docker here, so nothing was run
end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
Docker's volume list has no size, so add a "Compute sizes" button that runs
`docker system df` (via client.df()) and shows per-volume size in a new Size
column. The df walk is expensive (seconds), so results are cached ~60s and
loaded on demand instead of on every poll.
- volume_service.volume_sizes(force) with a 60s TTL cache; GET /api/volumes/sizes
+ agent /agent/volumes/sizes + proxy /api/agents/{id}/volumes/sizes.
- Frontend: volumesApi.sizes(force, agentId); Volumes page gained a Size column
and a Compute sizes button (per host) that triggers the lookup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
