3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
menzeljandClaude Opus 5	09bed274eb	Lock stacks during compose runs, cache stats, persist runtime state (0.47.0) ... F7 — Nothing stopped two compose operations landing on the same stack. There was a busy flag, but is_busy() was only ever read to colour the status column; no lifecycle handler consulted it before acting. Two tabs, or auto-update picking up a stack somebody had just clicked, both ran pull + up -d against the same project and raced over recreating containers. Lifecycle calls, the two deploy WebSockets and the auto-update pass now take a real lock; a second caller gets 409 (or an error frame and close 4409) and auto-update skips and retries next cycle. The lock is a row rather than a set in one worker's memory, so it holds across workers and across a restart, and it carries an expiry — a worker killed mid-deploy would otherwise strand the stack with no fix short of editing the database. F10 — /api/stacks/stats sampled every running container on every call, one blocking daemon request each, and both the dashboard and the stacks list poll it every five seconds. Two tabs on a 40-container host meant a sustained ~16 samples a second. Cached for 4s behind a lock so concurrent callers share one sweep, the same shape dashboard_service already used for its fleet aggregate. F11 — Three module dicts assumed exactly one uvicorn worker without saying so and were lost on restart. The busy set is the lock above. The image update cache is now mirrored to SQLite, so a restart shows the badges immediately instead of blanking them for up to an hour, and the already-notified marks come back with them rather than re-announcing the same updates. The login rate limiter is a table, so it cannot be cleared by getting the process to restart and no longer multiplies by the worker count. The constraint that shaped this: compose_service and update_service are shared with the agent, which has no database. Neither may import one. So the lock is a separate service the central app enforces at its own entry points, and update persistence is an opt-in callback the central app registers in its lifespan — the agent registers nothing and behaves exactly as before. A test asserts update_service never imports the database, since that is the kind of thing a later change breaks silently. Both new nets were checked by reverting the fix: dropping the lock from _lifecycle fails six tests, removing the stats cache fails the one that names the behaviour. Also wires up cache pruning in the same sweep — without it both the dict and the table grew one entry per image tag ever run, for the life of the install. 31 new tests (729 total). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG	2026-08-31 13:43:39 +02:00
menzeljandClaude Opus 5	41a21b5a25	Make tokens revocable and move the refresh token out of localStorage (0.46.0) ... F5 — A token was valid until it expired, full stop. Resetting a compromised account's password changed nothing for whoever held its tokens (up to 30 days for a refresh token), demoting or disabling an account only took effect once the same clock ran out, and logout was purely client-side. Every account now has a token_version, every token is minted carrying it, and every request compares the two. Bumping it is the revoke switch, pulled on the three changes that alter what an account may do: password, role, active flag. "Sign out everywhere" in the user menu bumps your own. Plain "Sign out" only drops the cookie, because signing out on your phone should not kill your desktop session. The refresh token left localStorage for an httpOnly cookie (SameSite=Lax, scoped to /api/auth), and the access token is now held in memory only. A successful XSS can still act inside the open page but can no longer walk off with 30 days of access. The cookie is marked Secure only when the request arrived over HTTPS — request.url.scheme is trustworthy since the F4 fix — so a plain-HTTP homelab keeps working. Any refresh token an older build left in localStorage is deleted on first load. Scripted clients that cannot hold a cookie can still ask for it in the body with ?in_body=true. F9 comes with it, as predicted: the WebSocket helpers read the role off the live user instead of the token's claim. /ws/exec is root-equivalent on the host, and a token minted while the account was an admin stayed syntactically valid after a demotion. The sharp edge was the migration, not the feature. _ensure_model_columns emits ADD COLUMN without a DEFAULT, so SQLite would have filled token_version with NULL on every existing install, every version check would have failed against it, and the upgrade would have locked out every user everywhere. The helper now renders NOT NULL DEFAULT <literal> for scalar defaults; test_schema_migration builds a genuinely old-shaped user table and asserts the backfill. The version comparison also tolerates NULL as 1, so a database migrated by some other route still works. Writing that test surfaced an undocumented precondition: _ensure_model_columns does nothing unless `models` has been imported, since SQLModel.metadata is empty until then. It holds in production because init_db imports first; now it says so. The authorization matrix did its job — adding two auth routes failed the suite until both were classified, which is exactly the review moment it exists for. 30 new tests (698 total). Upgrading signs everyone out once. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG	2026-08-31 13:31:00 +02:00
menzeljandClaude Opus 5	60a7ccff93	Add a test suite, a linter and a CI gate in front of the build (0.45.0) ... The repo had no tests, no lint config, and a CI that went straight from push to docker push. That is the reason F1 could ship: authorization lives in the routers, each of 171 routes independently picks require_admin or get_current_user, and nothing checked the choice was right. 670 tests, no Docker daemon needed. The app is driven through TestClient without entering it as a context manager, which skips the lifespan — no background loops, no socket — and conftest points DATA_DIR/STACKS_DIR at a temp directory before anything is imported. test_route_authorization.py is the load-bearing one. Rather than 171 implied decisions it states the policy once — every route requires admin unless it is listed in USER_READABLE or PUBLIC — and fails on any route that disagrees. A new route defaults to admin, which is the safe direction; what it catches is a route written with get_current_user that nobody weighed against "can this return a credential". Writing the allowlist meant auditing all 53 user-readable routes, which turned up one more leak: GET /api/templates/{id} returns a template's env, and "save stack as template" snapshots the stack's real .env into it. Now admin-only; the listing stays open. test_agent_authorization.py pins the same invariant on the agent, where the whole access model is one shared token declared per route and a single forgotten Depends(verify_token) would hand over the host. Both were checked by reintroducing the bug: re-opening /api/files/read fails three tests with actionable messages, dropping a token guard fails two. test_bundled_templates.py covers the 83 templates — parse, image per service, .env.example in sync with what compose reads, every bind-mounted file actually shipped, and no working default password. It found one on its first run: authentik shipped PG_PASS=change-me and AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY=change-me against a compose that marks both required, so the stack would have come up with a known password instead of refusing to start. Fixed. The rest ports the ad-hoc harnesses from 0.44.0 into permanent tests (crypto round-trip incl. plaintext passthrough and key-loss handling, the browse sandbox) and covers compose_service's slug/status/file handling and secret_service's name validation. ruff is configured as a floor, not a style bar: F, E9 and B only. Import sorting is deliberately out — it is style, and enabling it would rewrite the imports of nine files that have nothing else wrong. The 12 findings it did have are fixed here (unused imports, an unused local, four raise-without-from that were swallowing exception context). CI now runs check (ruff, pytest, tsc) and only builds if it passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG	2026-08-31 13:16:41 +02:00