F7 — Nothing stopped two compose operations landing on the same stack. There
was a busy flag, but is_busy() was only ever read to colour the status column;
no lifecycle handler consulted it before acting. Two tabs, or auto-update
picking up a stack somebody had just clicked, both ran pull + up -d against the
same project and raced over recreating containers.
Lifecycle calls, the two deploy WebSockets and the auto-update pass now take a
real lock; a second caller gets 409 (or an error frame and close 4409) and
auto-update skips and retries next cycle. The lock is a row rather than a set
in one worker's memory, so it holds across workers and across a restart, and it
carries an expiry — a worker killed mid-deploy would otherwise strand the stack
with no fix short of editing the database.
F10 — /api/stacks/stats sampled every running container on every call, one
blocking daemon request each, and both the dashboard and the stacks list poll
it every five seconds. Two tabs on a 40-container host meant a sustained ~16
samples a second. Cached for 4s behind a lock so concurrent callers share one
sweep, the same shape dashboard_service already used for its fleet aggregate.
F11 — Three module dicts assumed exactly one uvicorn worker without saying so
and were lost on restart. The busy set is the lock above. The image update
cache is now mirrored to SQLite, so a restart shows the badges immediately
instead of blanking them for up to an hour, and the already-notified marks come
back with them rather than re-announcing the same updates. The login rate
limiter is a table, so it cannot be cleared by getting the process to restart
and no longer multiplies by the worker count.
The constraint that shaped this: compose_service and update_service are shared
with the agent, which has no database. Neither may import one. So the lock is a
separate service the central app enforces at its own entry points, and update
persistence is an opt-in callback the central app registers in its lifespan —
the agent registers nothing and behaves exactly as before. A test asserts
update_service never imports the database, since that is the kind of thing a
later change breaks silently.
Both new nets were checked by reverting the fix: dropping the lock from
_lifecycle fails six tests, removing the stats cache fails the one that names
the behaviour.
Also wires up cache pruning in the same sweep — without it both the dict and
the table grew one entry per image tag ever run, for the life of the install.
31 new tests (729 total).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
The repo had no tests, no lint config, and a CI that went straight from push
to docker push. That is the reason F1 could ship: authorization lives in the
routers, each of 171 routes independently picks require_admin or
get_current_user, and nothing checked the choice was right.
670 tests, no Docker daemon needed. The app is driven through TestClient
without entering it as a context manager, which skips the lifespan — no
background loops, no socket — and conftest points DATA_DIR/STACKS_DIR at a
temp directory before anything is imported.
test_route_authorization.py is the load-bearing one. Rather than 171 implied
decisions it states the policy once — every route requires admin unless it is
listed in USER_READABLE or PUBLIC — and fails on any route that disagrees. A
new route defaults to admin, which is the safe direction; what it catches is a
route written with get_current_user that nobody weighed against "can this
return a credential". Writing the allowlist meant auditing all 53 user-readable
routes, which turned up one more leak: GET /api/templates/{id} returns a
template's env, and "save stack as template" snapshots the stack's real .env
into it. Now admin-only; the listing stays open.
test_agent_authorization.py pins the same invariant on the agent, where the
whole access model is one shared token declared per route and a single
forgotten Depends(verify_token) would hand over the host.
Both were checked by reintroducing the bug: re-opening /api/files/read fails
three tests with actionable messages, dropping a token guard fails two.
test_bundled_templates.py covers the 83 templates — parse, image per service,
.env.example in sync with what compose reads, every bind-mounted file actually
shipped, and no working default password. It found one on its first run:
authentik shipped PG_PASS=change-me and AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY=change-me against
a compose that marks both required, so the stack would have come up with a
known password instead of refusing to start. Fixed.
The rest ports the ad-hoc harnesses from 0.44.0 into permanent tests (crypto
round-trip incl. plaintext passthrough and key-loss handling, the browse
sandbox) and covers compose_service's slug/status/file handling and
secret_service's name validation.
ruff is configured as a floor, not a style bar: F, E9 and B only. Import
sorting is deliberately out — it is style, and enabling it would rewrite the
imports of nine files that have nothing else wrong. The 12 findings it did have
are fixed here (unused imports, an unused local, four raise-without-from that
were swallowing exception context).
CI now runs check (ruff, pytest, tsc) and only builds if it passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
The amber image-update indicator is fed from update_service._CACHE, which
only the background loop refreshed — after a per-stack Update/Pull the
stale digests kept the pill on until the next pass. Now the local digests
are reconciled with the cached remote digests right after a successful
pull/update (local backend, agent lifecycle, auto-update pass), and the
frontend invalidates the stack-updates queries after actions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shows an amber "Update" pill next to a stack's status (and highlights the
inline Update button) when any of the stack's images has a newer digest in
the registry. Reuses the existing background image-update check — a new
update_service.stacks_update_summary() reads the cached digests in a single
container sweep (no extra registry calls), exposed as GET /api/stacks/updates
and proxied per agent at GET /api/agents/{id}/stacks/updates. The Stacks page
and each remote-host section poll it every 60s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-stack auto-update policy on the stack Overview tab. When the background
image-update check finds a newer registry digest for one of a stack's images,
the stack is pulled + redeployed (or just flagged, "notify only"). Only running
stacks are auto-redeployed; a stopped stack is skipped, never silently started.
- models/auto_update.py: AutoUpdate(stack_id, agent_id, enabled, redeploy,
last_run/status/result) + schemas; registered in models/__init__.py.
- update_service: DB-free stack_images/stack_updates helpers (agent reuses
them); agent GET /agent/stacks/{id}/updates.
- services/auto_update_service.py: run_due/run_policy (local pull+up via
compose_service, remote via agent_service POST /agent/stacks/{id}/update,
notify-only with per-transition dedup); lazy-called from
update_service.background_loop. New stack_auto_updated notify event.
- routers: GET/PUT/run /api/stacks/{id}/auto-update and the
/api/agents/{id}/stacks/{sid}/auto-update variants (policy stored centrally).
- frontend: api/autoUpdate.ts + AutoUpdatePanel (enable, redeploy|notify-only,
Check now, last-run status) on StackDetail + RemoteStackDetail; EVENT_LABELS
gains stack_auto_updated + backup_failed.
Live-verified all four paths (updated / update-available / up-to-date /
skipped) against real compose.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
