F7 — Nothing stopped two compose operations landing on the same stack. There
was a busy flag, but is_busy() was only ever read to colour the status column;
no lifecycle handler consulted it before acting. Two tabs, or auto-update
picking up a stack somebody had just clicked, both ran pull + up -d against the
same project and raced over recreating containers.
Lifecycle calls, the two deploy WebSockets and the auto-update pass now take a
real lock; a second caller gets 409 (or an error frame and close 4409) and
auto-update skips and retries next cycle. The lock is a row rather than a set
in one worker's memory, so it holds across workers and across a restart, and it
carries an expiry — a worker killed mid-deploy would otherwise strand the stack
with no fix short of editing the database.
F10 — /api/stacks/stats sampled every running container on every call, one
blocking daemon request each, and both the dashboard and the stacks list poll
it every five seconds. Two tabs on a 40-container host meant a sustained ~16
samples a second. Cached for 4s behind a lock so concurrent callers share one
sweep, the same shape dashboard_service already used for its fleet aggregate.
F11 — Three module dicts assumed exactly one uvicorn worker without saying so
and were lost on restart. The busy set is the lock above. The image update
cache is now mirrored to SQLite, so a restart shows the badges immediately
instead of blanking them for up to an hour, and the already-notified marks come
back with them rather than re-announcing the same updates. The login rate
limiter is a table, so it cannot be cleared by getting the process to restart
and no longer multiplies by the worker count.
The constraint that shaped this: compose_service and update_service are shared
with the agent, which has no database. Neither may import one. So the lock is a
separate service the central app enforces at its own entry points, and update
persistence is an opt-in callback the central app registers in its lifespan —
the agent registers nothing and behaves exactly as before. A test asserts
update_service never imports the database, since that is the kind of thing a
later change breaks silently.
Both new nets were checked by reverting the fix: dropping the lock from
_lifecycle fails six tests, removing the stats cache fails the one that names
the behaviour.
Also wires up cache pruning in the same sweep — without it both the dict and
the table grew one entry per image tag ever run, for the life of the install.
31 new tests (729 total).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
The repo had no tests, no lint config, and a CI that went straight from push
to docker push. That is the reason F1 could ship: authorization lives in the
routers, each of 171 routes independently picks require_admin or
get_current_user, and nothing checked the choice was right.
670 tests, no Docker daemon needed. The app is driven through TestClient
without entering it as a context manager, which skips the lifespan — no
background loops, no socket — and conftest points DATA_DIR/STACKS_DIR at a
temp directory before anything is imported.
test_route_authorization.py is the load-bearing one. Rather than 171 implied
decisions it states the policy once — every route requires admin unless it is
listed in USER_READABLE or PUBLIC — and fails on any route that disagrees. A
new route defaults to admin, which is the safe direction; what it catches is a
route written with get_current_user that nobody weighed against "can this
return a credential". Writing the allowlist meant auditing all 53 user-readable
routes, which turned up one more leak: GET /api/templates/{id} returns a
template's env, and "save stack as template" snapshots the stack's real .env
into it. Now admin-only; the listing stays open.
test_agent_authorization.py pins the same invariant on the agent, where the
whole access model is one shared token declared per route and a single
forgotten Depends(verify_token) would hand over the host.
Both were checked by reintroducing the bug: re-opening /api/files/read fails
three tests with actionable messages, dropping a token guard fails two.
test_bundled_templates.py covers the 83 templates — parse, image per service,
.env.example in sync with what compose reads, every bind-mounted file actually
shipped, and no working default password. It found one on its first run:
authentik shipped PG_PASS=change-me and AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY=change-me against
a compose that marks both required, so the stack would have come up with a
known password instead of refusing to start. Fixed.
The rest ports the ad-hoc harnesses from 0.44.0 into permanent tests (crypto
round-trip incl. plaintext passthrough and key-loss handling, the browse
sandbox) and covers compose_service's slug/status/file handling and
secret_service's name validation.
ruff is configured as a floor, not a style bar: F, E9 and B only. Import
sorting is deliberately out — it is style, and enabling it would rewrite the
imports of nine files that have nothing else wrong. The 12 findings it did have
are fixed here (unused imports, an unused local, four raise-without-from that
were swallowing exception context).
CI now runs check (ruff, pytest, tsc) and only builds if it passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
F1 — Any authenticated user could read any file the backend could see.
/api/files/read and /download hung on get_current_user, and the sandbox that
should have caught that was open by default: ALLOWED_BROWSE_ROOTS contained
"/", for which _is_allowed() waves through every path. So the `user` role could
download stackpilot.db (password hashes, agent tokens, backup credentials),
every stack's .env and every .secrets/* file — with no audit trail, because
only mutations were logged.
Implementing that turned up three more doors into the same room, all fixed
here since closing only the first would have made the fix cosmetic:
GET /api/stacks/{id} handed the .env to any user, /export tarred the whole
stack dir including .secrets/*, and both the agent file proxies and
/api/agents/{id}/stacks/{id} repeated the leak for every remote host. All 24
filesystem-touching routes are now admin-only; reads and downloads are audited
(listing is not — the Files page polls it). DATA_DIR is refused outright, since
the API deliberately masks agent tokens and destination secrets and the browser
would otherwise be the way around that. "/" is out of the default browse roots.
F2 — Backup destination credentials were plaintext JSON in the DB, which is
what made F1 worth exploiting. They are now Fernet-encrypted at rest behind
parse_config/dump_config, with existing rows migrated at startup.
This needed a prerequisite from F6: the key is derived from SECRET_KEY, which
was regenerated on every boot when unset. Encrypting against a key that changes
per restart would be worse than plaintext, so an auto-generated SECRET_KEY is
now persisted to ${DATA_DIR}/secret_key at mode 0600. Sessions surviving a
restart is a welcome side effect.
F3 — /api/audit is admin-only. Also hidden from the dashboard and the nav for
non-admins, so nobody polls into a 403.
F4 — uvicorn now runs with --proxy-headers, so nginx's X-Forwarded-For is
honoured. Without it request.client.host was the frontend container's IP for
every request, which made the login rate limit global instead of per-IP (10
failures locked out everyone) and filled the audit log's IP column with one
useless value.
Verified: encrypt/decrypt round-trip incl. plaintext passthrough, idempotent
re-encryption and wrong-key handling; sandbox denial for DATA_DIR, traversal
into it, and paths outside the roots, with the allowed roots still reachable.
Both against stubbed settings — there is no Docker here, so nothing was run
end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG
The amber image-update indicator is fed from update_service._CACHE, which
only the background loop refreshed — after a per-stack Update/Pull the
stale digests kept the pill on until the next pass. Now the local digests
are reconciled with the cached remote digests right after a successful
pull/update (local backend, agent lifecycle, auto-update pass), and the
frontend invalidates the stack-updates queries after actions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shows an amber "Update" pill next to a stack's status (and highlights the
inline Update button) when any of the stack's images has a newer digest in
the registry. Reuses the existing background image-update check — a new
update_service.stacks_update_summary() reads the cached digests in a single
container sweep (no extra registry calls), exposed as GET /api/stacks/updates
and proxied per agent at GET /api/agents/{id}/stacks/updates. The Stacks page
and each remote-host section poll it every 60s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-stack auto-update policy on the stack Overview tab. When the background
image-update check finds a newer registry digest for one of a stack's images,
the stack is pulled + redeployed (or just flagged, "notify only"). Only running
stacks are auto-redeployed; a stopped stack is skipped, never silently started.
- models/auto_update.py: AutoUpdate(stack_id, agent_id, enabled, redeploy,
last_run/status/result) + schemas; registered in models/__init__.py.
- update_service: DB-free stack_images/stack_updates helpers (agent reuses
them); agent GET /agent/stacks/{id}/updates.
- services/auto_update_service.py: run_due/run_policy (local pull+up via
compose_service, remote via agent_service POST /agent/stacks/{id}/update,
notify-only with per-transition dedup); lazy-called from
update_service.background_loop. New stack_auto_updated notify event.
- routers: GET/PUT/run /api/stacks/{id}/auto-update and the
/api/agents/{id}/stacks/{sid}/auto-update variants (policy stored centrally).
- frontend: api/autoUpdate.ts + AutoUpdatePanel (enable, redeploy|notify-only,
Check now, last-run status) on StackDetail + RemoteStackDetail; EVENT_LABELS
gains stack_auto_updated + backup_failed.
Live-verified all four paths (updated / update-available / up-to-date /
skipped) against real compose.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stacks overview and detail were doing an N+1 inspect storm: list_stacks
called containers_for_stack AND compute_status (which re-fetched) per
stack, and containers.list(sparse=False) full-inspects every container
plus c.image triggered an image-inspect each. For N stacks that was
~2N*(1 list + M inspects + M image-inspects) sequential socket round
trips (~1s for just 2 stacks, growing linearly).
- compose_service.stack_status_summaries(): one low-level
api.containers(all=True) summary call grouped by compose project label
→ whole list served in a single Docker round-trip (~10x faster).
- compute_status() takes optional pre-fetched containers; get_stack and
_stack_summary no longer double-fetch.
- containers_for_stack() reads the image name from the inspect it already
has instead of c.image (drops the per-container image-inspect).
- Same batching applied to the agent's stack list/detail.
Also: Forgejo (registry + git) moved to 10.10.6.10:3020 — updated image
refs in docker-compose.yml, agent/Dockerfile, agent/docker-compose.yml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dashboard now lists stacks in a table with live CPU and memory usage per
stack. Usage is sampled from docker stats (one-shot read per running container,
using the daemon-provided precpu for the CPU delta) and aggregated by compose
project.
- services/stats_service.py + GET /api/stacks/stats: per-stack cpu_used (cores),
mem_used (bytes minus reclaimable cache), and the summed assigned cpu/mem
limits (null when none set), read concurrently across containers.
- Dashboard: stacks render as a table with a CPU and a Memory meter. When a
limit is assigned the bar fills toward it (used / limit + %); otherwise it
fills toward the host total. Inline start/stop/restart per row for admins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
