Make tokens revocable and move the refresh token out of localStorage (0.46.0)

F5 — A token was valid until it expired, full stop. Resetting a compromised
account's password changed nothing for whoever held its tokens (up to 30 days
for a refresh token), demoting or disabling an account only took effect once
the same clock ran out, and logout was purely client-side.

Every account now has a token_version, every token is minted carrying it, and
every request compares the two. Bumping it is the revoke switch, pulled on the
three changes that alter what an account may do: password, role, active flag.
"Sign out everywhere" in the user menu bumps your own. Plain "Sign out" only
drops the cookie, because signing out on your phone should not kill your
desktop session.

The refresh token left localStorage for an httpOnly cookie (SameSite=Lax,
scoped to /api/auth), and the access token is now held in memory only. A
successful XSS can still act inside the open page but can no longer walk off
with 30 days of access. The cookie is marked Secure only when the request
arrived over HTTPS — request.url.scheme is trustworthy since the F4 fix — so a
plain-HTTP homelab keeps working. Any refresh token an older build left in
localStorage is deleted on first load. Scripted clients that cannot hold a
cookie can still ask for it in the body with ?in_body=true.

F9 comes with it, as predicted: the WebSocket helpers read the role off the
live user instead of the token's claim. /ws/exec is root-equivalent on the
host, and a token minted while the account was an admin stayed syntactically
valid after a demotion.

The sharp edge was the migration, not the feature. _ensure_model_columns emits
ADD COLUMN without a DEFAULT, so SQLite would have filled token_version with
NULL on every existing install, every version check would have failed against
it, and the upgrade would have locked out every user everywhere. The helper now
renders NOT NULL DEFAULT <literal> for scalar defaults; test_schema_migration
builds a genuinely old-shaped user table and asserts the backfill. The version
comparison also tolerates NULL as 1, so a database migrated by some other route
still works.

Writing that test surfaced an undocumented precondition: _ensure_model_columns
does nothing unless `models` has been imported, since SQLModel.metadata is
empty until then. It holds in production because init_db imports first; now it
says so.

The authorization matrix did its job — adding two auth routes failed the suite
until both were classified, which is exactly the review moment it exists for.

30 new tests (698 total). Upgrading signs everyone out once.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dk43rmEeRfYi5wsLDbmfyG

backend/routers/ws.py

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, Query, WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect
 from jose import JWTError
 from sqlmodel import Session
 
-from auth import decode_token
+from auth import decode_token, resolve_token_user
 from database import engine
 from models.agent import Agent
 from models.setting import EVENT_PULL_FAILED, EVENT_STACK_ERROR, EVENT_STACK_START
@@ -30,14 +30,30 @@ logger = logging.getLogger("stackpilot.ws")
 router = APIRouter(tags=["ws"])
 
 
+def _user_for(token: str | None):
+    """The live user behind a socket's token, or None.
+
+    Resolves against the database rather than reading the role straight off the
+    JWT: a socket can outlive a demotion, a disabled account or a password
+    reset, and the exec endpoint below is root-equivalent on the host. Same
+    check the HTTP routes make.
+    """
+    if not token:
+        return None
+    try:
+        payload = decode_token(token, "access")
+    except (JWTError, Exception):  # noqa: BLE001
+        return None
+    with Session(engine) as session:
+        user = resolve_token_user(session, payload)
+        if user:
+            session.expunge(user)
+        return user
+
+
 async def _authorize(websocket: WebSocket, token: str | None) -> bool:
     """Validate the JWT supplied as a query param. Closes socket on failure."""
-    if not token:
-        await websocket.close(code=4401)
-        return False
-    try:
-        decode_token(token, "access")
-    except (JWTError, Exception):  # noqa: BLE001
+    if _user_for(token) is None:
         await websocket.close(code=4401)
         return False
     return True
@@ -47,15 +63,11 @@ async def _authorize_admin(websocket: WebSocket, token: str | None) -> bool:
     """Like _authorize but also requires the admin role (exec is root-equivalent).
 
     Closes 4401 on a missing/invalid token, 4403 on a valid non-admin token."""
-    if not token:
+    user = _user_for(token)
+    if user is None:
         await websocket.close(code=4401)
         return False
-    try:
-        payload = decode_token(token, "access")
-    except (JWTError, Exception):  # noqa: BLE001
-        await websocket.close(code=4401)
-        return False
-    if payload.get("role") != "admin":
+    if user.role != "admin":
         await websocket.close(code=4403)
         return False
     return True